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ABSTRACT
MARKET VALUATION OF CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION IN
THE PRESENCE OF INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
IN EMERGING COUNTRIES
Supannee Buasook 
Old Dominion University, 2003 
Director: Dr. Mohammad Najand
This study examines the valuation of corporate diversification in three emerging 
countries: Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. Over the period o f study (1992-2001 
for Thailand and 1994-2001 for Indonesia and the Philippines), it is found that there is 
evidence o f diversification discount in all three countries. The largest amount of 
discount exists in the Philippines (60.1%), followed by Indonesia (25.5%) and Thailand 
(15.1%).
Then, the sample is divided into two sub-periods: before the crisis (1992-1996) 
and after the crisis (1997-2001). Before the crisis, the diversification discount existed 
only in the Philippines, with the average of 49%. There is not enough evidence that 
diversified firms in both Thailand and Indonesia traded at discount, compared to 
focused firms.
After the crisis, however, it is found that there is difference in market valuation 
between diversified and focused firms in all three countries, with the average discount 
of 84.3% in the Philippines, 33.2% in Indonesia and 16.7% in Thailand.
The results are confirmed after performing the regression on yearly data as well 
as panel data analysis.
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This study also finds that growth, represented by capital expenditure-to-sales 
ratio, signals good news to the market. It could add value to the firms although the 
amount is relatively small. On the other hand, investors evaluate debt as bad news. 
Therefore, an increase in debt could result in a value reduction.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Several companies in the 1980s built conglomerate empires in the name o f 
diversification and value creation. In the 1990s these empires were dismantled in the 
name of focus and, ironically, value creation. Corporate diversification was generally 
believed to add value by reducing investors’ risk and the risk of managers employed in 
a single sector, as well as creating financing opportunities and economies of scope. 
Later research shows that many of these benefits appear exaggerated or even do not 
exist. Several studies document that corporate diversification is actually not beneficial 
for shareholders. For example, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) show that during the 
1980s, diversifying acquisitions decreased shareholders’ wealth. Lang and Stuz (1994), 
Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), and Lins and Servaes (1999) find that in 
developed capital markets, on average, diversification does not enhance shareholder 
wealth. In the more recent paper, Lins and Servaes (2002) study the value of 
diversification in emerging markets, which includes Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. Using 1995 data, they report that 
diversified firms trade at a discount of approximately eight percent compared to focused 
firms. The discount is even larger in countries with poorly developed external capital 
markets. The evidence leads to the conclusion that corporate diversification is
The format of the reference section in this paper has followed that of Journal of 
Finance.
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2inefficient. It is more likely to be m  agency phenomenon rather than to improve 
efficiency. Whereas the value of diversification as an intangible asset is being 
questioned, a trend toward corporate focus has increasingly become a popular strategy. 
A number of diversified firms have been broken up to focus on only a few core
businesses.
While the Western conglomerates assembled in the 1960s through 1980s have 
been dismantled, the diversified business groups remains the typical strategy of 
enterprise throughout most emerging markets. Since Western corporate strategies have 
long been held up as role models for businesses in emerging countries, there is an effort 
to dismantle the diversified business groups in these countries in the same way that 
companies in advanced economies do. As emerging markets open up to global 
competition, consultants and foreign investors are increasingly pushing these companies 
to follow Western practice. It is believed that breaking up these diversified firms could 
reduce their inefficiencies and promote better entrepreneurship. However, the strategy 
that works well in developed countries may not provide the same results in emerging 
economies due to the differences in market infrastructure, business culture and political 
system. Although a focused strategy may enable a firm to perform more efficiently, 
companies in emerging markets have more responsibility in order to do business 
effectively. They need to perform a wide range of functions that are not practical for 
focused firms. Therefore, diversified firms in these countries could add value by 
imitating the functions of several institutions that are present in advanced economies.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3The role of corporate diversification In emerging countries
An emerging market is a market with high potential growth rate, which recently 
has opened up to the global economy. It offers the prospect of substantial growth but 
falls short in a range of institutions that facilitate the function of markets. As a result, 
companies in emerging economies have to perform basic functions themselves. Capital 
markets in these countries, unlike those in advanced economies, are far from efficient 
A dearth of information is commonly seen. Without access to information investors 
tend to be reluctant to put their money into unfamiliar ventures. The absence of market 
institutions such as investment banks playing an important role in the allocation of 
capital to business increases the difficulty in raising money to fund profitable projects. 
Instead of relying on those institutions, diversified firms use their internally generated 
capital to extend existing businesses or to enter a new one. They also have superior 
access to capital markets. Their ability to raise capital to fund profitable investments 
gives them more advantage over small focused companies.
Much of the literature on corporate diversification argues that an efficient 
internal capital market may create value for shareholders. Using internal funds, a 
segment of a diversified firm would be able to invest in profitable projects regardless of 
its own cash flow. Lamont (1997) studies diversification in the oil industry and finds 
that investment in a division of a diversified firm largely depends on the success of the 
other unrelated industry divisions. His study shows that when oil prices dropped in the 
mid-1980s, investment in non-oil divisions fell substantially. Shin and Stuz (1998) also 
find that investment by segments of highly diversified firms is less sensitive to their 
cash flows than investment of comparable single-segment firms.
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4According to Gertner, Scliarfstein and Stein (1994), and Stein (1997), internal 
capital markets are beneficial, particularly where access to external funds is limited or 
unavailable. Using industry-adjusted valuation, Klein (2001) presents that in the 1960s, 
conglomerates were valued at premium. He reports that evidence from acquisition 
histories suggests that during that period conglomerate diversification may have added 
value by creating internal capital markets. Khanna and Palepu (1997) argue that not 
only do diversified business groups in emerging economies have the potential to add 
value by exploiting capital markets, but they are capable of gaining advantage over 
labor and product markets as well.
In addition to the lack of efficient capital markets, governments in most 
emerging countries operate very differently from those in developed countries. The 
political intervention is much more extensive in business operation. Dealing with bribes 
and other corrupt practice may be part of doing business. Maintaining a good 
relationship with governments is certainly beneficial but costly. It is more likely that 
diversified companies, which are normally larger, are able to carry the cost.
The benefits of corporate diversification in emerging markets may be so 
significant that in the absence of market infrastructure, diversification may be the best 
way to match up against competitors in developed countries who have access to 
advanced technology, cheap financing, and sophisticated managerial know-how.
The objective and scope of the dissertation
The objective of this study is to examine how the market values corporate 
diversification in emerging countries. In particular, the study will concentrate on three 
Southeast Asian countries: Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines during 1992-2001.
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5Due to financial liberalization, during that period the capital markets in these countries 
changed considerably. External financing is now relatively more accessible. The 
importance of internal capital markets in funding valuable projects is reduced. This may 
affect the potential benefits/or costs of diversification at the firm level.
Among Southeast Asian countries, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia are 
fundamentally similar in terms of economic and political system. They all have a 
reputation for cronyism, cartels, monopolies and social inequity. However, their 
governments are becoming more democratic and open in the aftermath of the crisis. The 
most dramatic change has occurred in Indonesia. Economic turmoil had wrought one 
fundamental change in the politics of Southeast Asia: the fall of the 32-year-old Suharto 
regime in Indonesia. Megawati Sukarnoputri became the president after her predecessor 
was impeached on July 23, 2001. Though far less pronounced, political risk has also 
fallen sharply in Thailand and the Philippines. In Thailand the crisis has contributed to 
political reform. A new constitution, which was passed in September 1997, shortly after 
the crisis, required elections under new rules, supposedly less susceptible to vote- 
buying. When Gloria Macapagal Arroyo gained the presidency after Joseph Estrada in 
January 2001, the Philippines became politically more stable. Understandably, 
dictatorship in these countries was already giving away to varieties of democracy. It 
could be implied that to some extent this part of Southeast Asia has politically 
stabilized.
The macroeconomic situation in these countries has also improved dramatically. 
The pile of short-term foreign-curreney debt that triggered the 1997-98 panic has 
largely been repaid or rescheduled. Most currencies are no longer fixed after the
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6calamity underlined the hazards of ‘fixed’ exchange rate, especially when combined 
with hasty capital-account liberalization and poor regulation of domestic finance. 
Besides improving political accountability, the crisis has also raised awareness among 
domestic investors, who will be keen to improve transparency and corporate governance 
in the companies they are asked to invest in. Though foreign complaints help, more 
demand by domestic investors has the best chance of pushing further capital market 
reforms. Many companies, officials and consumers behave differently from what they 
did in 1997. The cronies who once exploited political connections to monopolize 
business contracts are fighting simply to survive. New governments have taken power, 
trying to open closed political systems. Consumers are benefiting from falling prices 
and more choices as monopolies give away to market forces, setting in motion a boom 
in domestic consumption that is helping these economies offset a slowdown in demand 
for their exports.
The crisis has also turned out to be the catalyst converting family-dominated 
conglomerates into institutionally owned ones, which may lead to the end of highly 
centralized, autocratic family feudal systems. Many companies are recruiting foreign 
board directors and becoming more responsive to shareholder interests. In Thailand key 
sectors such as banking and cement have seen consolidation and staff cutbacks, 
producing higher margins. Many companies have brought in foreign management 
expertise. The patriarchal Confucian system— wherein the boss, like father, is always
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7right—is starting to break down.1 It is difficult for people in this region to realize that 
work life is not family life, but there is a slow awakening.
Since the economic meltdown o f 1997, Southeast Asia has seen a tightening of 
accounting standards and stock market regulation. Even though new laws and 
regulations require firm and fairer enforcement, no countries in the region have 
succeeded in insulating business from politics. Family ownership remains widespread, 
and family members often serve as senior managers. However, in order to fully recover 
from the crisis, these countries need a large amount of capital from foreign investors. 
And their businesses need to become more transparent if  they seek to win cheaper 
financing and raise their prices. As their economies are open, companies tend to rely 
mainly on capital markets for equity and debt rather than on banks. The problem is that 
capital markets are naturally volatile. They attract huge inflows that can just as quickly 
turn into huge outflows. No wonder that some countries as well as some investors 
mistrust capital markets, and especially stock markets. However, there are also 
substantial virtues in relying on capital markets. Unlike bank lending, they are less 
likely to be subject to political interference, which is apparently significant in cronyism 
countries. Because they react continuously and almost instantaneously, equity and debt 
markets immediately capture any changes in perception about the economies, or about 
confidence, or about risk. They are quickly repriced to reflect new circumstances,
j
For example, at Thai Farmers Bank Public Co., President and CEO Bantam Lamsam was among 
the first who introduced merit-based compensation and put foreign executives in such a key posts as 
head of human resources. He has encouraged his staff to think outside the box rather than follow the 
traditional rules all the time. (How The Crisis Changed Asia And How It Dido’ t, Business Week; 
New York; M  1,2002; Frederick Balfour, Mark L. Clifford, Moon Inlwan and Michael Shall, Issue 
3789 pl8)
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8including new ideas and new technology. To all of which capital markets respond more 
quickly than banks. In addition, as they cut out a layer o f intermediation, capital 
markets are also generally cheaper than banks. Lastly, due to the finding that there is a 
strong positive correlation between the size and liquidity of stock exchanges and 
economic growth, the IFC, the private-sector arm of the World Bank, is keen to 
promote stock markets in emerging economies. (The Economist)
Since capital markets have increasingly played an important role in emerging 
economies, it would be beneficial for businesses in this region if Western investors, 
who believe that focus is always the best, think otherwise. They should not be worried 
about diversification per se. If diversified firms cannot add any value, then they should 
consider focusing. But they should not break up simply because they are forced to 
follow the same strategy as companies in advanced economies do or because it is easier 
for analysts to understand the dynamics o f a business, improve reporting and business 
visibility as well as reduce uncertainty. At the same time in order to attract funds from 
foreign investors, firms have to increase the transparency of their operations, 
communicate this change to investors and develop a reputation of doing so.
This dissertation is organized into six parts. Chapter I has introduced previous 
research and the role of corporate diversification in emerging countries, particularly in 
the three countries on which the study focuses. Chapter II discusses how diversification 
could create value. Chapter III explains why firms diversify as well as presents some 
theories, both supporting and against diversification. Hypotheses are also defined. 
Chapter IV states research methods. This chapter includes the sample, measurement and 
data analytical techniques used to test those hypotheses. Chapter V reports the empirical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
results. Lastly, chapter VI discusses the implications of the findings, the limit of this 
study. Potential future research is also suggested.
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CHAPTER II 
DIVERSIFICATION AND VALUE CREATION
This chapter examines the extent, trends, as well as patterns o f diversification; in 
an attempt to identify whether there is any support for the hypothesis that diversification 
creates value.
Diversification is not a new phenomenon. Instead it has long been pervasive 
throughout the major free market economies, particularly in developed countries, for 
decades. The trend is towards more diversification rather than less. Given the 
remarkable extent of diversification, it is reasonable to wonder whether it creates any 
economic value for the firm. Actually many claims have been made that synergistic 
benefits, both tangible and intangible value (e.g. utility) for management, might be 
available in a firm operating a multi-business unit portfolio, otherwise it would not have 
prospered for so long. For example, firms expanding into new products that can be sold 
through their existing distribution networks have potential to gain considerably from 
sharing those costs. Some have diversified into areas where they already have some 
technical expertise (e.g. electronics, chemicals). The sharing costs and skills between 
business units are certainly realized. If there were any economic disadvantages of 
diversification, the market forces would discourage it. Therefore, economic motives are 
likely to be able to explain the diversification phenomenon.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Measures of value
Theoretically, the net present value (NPV) is a simple and powerful tool to 
measure economic value of the firm. It measures the current value of future cash flows 
by estimating what the cash flows will be and discounting them at the rate that reflects 
the risk associated with those cash flows. Even though this approach is conceptually 
more accurate, the results could be misleading since only cash is included in the 
analysis. Other forms of benefits that might be created are ignored. Also some of the 
utilities have intangible value, which is difficult to measure in dollar terms. For 
example, a firm that has a variety of business in its portfolio and succeeds in building a 
position in the emerging stage of an industry life cycle is likely to gain a profitable and 
defensible position for many years to come. This firm has high potential to create value 
by exploiting that opportunity.
Accounting profits, on the other hand, reflect the historical cash generating 
ability. The actual value could be considerably more or less as they tend to be distorted 
by various accounting problems, including asset valuation and inflation. Like the NPV 
approach, the figures only include tangible assets. Thus, even though reported profits 
are the best information available, they are not a reliable measure of the value of the 
firm. It would be acceptable if the past profit profile is a good estimate of future cash 
flows. But it is unlikely being so.
The alternative that one can take to measure the value of the firm is market 
valuation. It reflects the value of the firm from the perspective of shareholders. They 
determine future potential for generating cash and discount it at an appropriate rate to 
reflect the risk. To the extent the market can provide an accurate value (even though it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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is not the total value) on a firm, assuming the stock market is efficient This measure 
includes both tangible as well as intangible assets, such as growth and management. 
The stock prices will, therefore, be used as measure of firms’ value throughout this 
study.
To illustrate how corporate diversification could create value, first I will 
examine the patterns of diversification that firms could undertake. Then the motives 
behind diversification strategies, that could help us understand why firms expand into 
new business areas, will be analyzed. These motives are likely to vary with the type of 
diversification. However, different motives sometimes could lead to the same 
diversification strategy. Firms that focus on growth, for instance, may expand into a 
number of related businesses because they feel familiar and more confident to deal with 
but have no attention to share costs. An understanding these motives also provide a 
better idea whether value is likely to be created in the diversification process. Finally 
mechanisms that could provide potential for value creation will be identified. Figure 1 
shows how the value of a firm could be created through diversification.
There are two major patterns of diversification: geographic or industrial 
diversification. Firms also diversify into related or unrelated to existing business 
depending on what are their motives. There are several motives that drive firms to 
diversify. For example, when firms feel that they are under threat from existing 
industry, the concern may drive them into an unrelated diversification in order to 
survive. Or they may consider undertaking geographic diversification in order to 
maintain growth rate. Motives and patterns o f diversification consistent with those
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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motives create potential for firms to diversify. How they diversify, however, depends on 
resources and opportunities, available at that time.
Mechanisms such as economies of expansion, synergy and market power is 
more likely to exist if  firms undertake the appropriate diversification. As a result, there 
is potential that diversification could add value to a firm.
FIGURE 1
Value creation through diversification
Motives for diversificationPatterns of diversification
Potential for diversification
'Mechanisms for value creation}
Potential for value creation 1
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Patterns of diversification
According to Bodnar and Weintrop (1997), there are two aspects of corporate
diversification:
1) Geographic diversification: when firms diversify their activities across 
national boundaries. A geographically diversified network provides firms the 
opportunities to expand firm-specific assets (such as research and 
development) and benefits from potential economies of scale for the use of 
these assets as well as the opportunities to exploit market conditions.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the result of geographic diversification, 
which occurs when a firm invests directly in facilities or buys an existing 
enterprise in order to produce and/or market a product in a foreign country. 
Once a firm undertakes FDI, it becomes a multinational enterprise.
Over the past 25 years there has been a marked increase in FDI in the world 
economy. According to Hill (1997), not only did the flow of FDI accelerate 
during the 1980s but it also accelerated faster than growth in world trade. 
Much of the recent increase in FDI is driven by the dramatic political and 
economic changes that have been occurring in many o f world’s developing 
nations. Across much of Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, 
increasing economic growth as well as deregulation made these countries 
more attractive to foreign investors. At the same time firms undertake 
geographical diversification in the attempt to make sure that they have 
significant presence in every region of the world. They believe that it is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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important to have production facilities based close to their major customers. 
Firms also gain location-specific advantages, according to John Dunning 
(1988), which arises from the abilities to utilize resource endowment or 
assets that are tied to a particular location and that firms find yaluable to
combine with their own unique assets such as technological, marketing, or 
management.
Since very few firms in the sample diversify globally, geographic 
diversification will not be included in this study.
2) Industrial diversification: when firms expand their activities across different 
lines of business. They can diversify using two possible diversification 
strategies:
a) Related diversification: A firm is considered undertaking related 
diversification when it expands into new products by relying on the 
original core skills to ensure that each new product adds strength to 
the existing products. In addition new products could utilize common 
support of a research or marketing program as well as spare 
management and technical capacity. As a result, a related diversified 
firm tends to participate in businesses characterized by a central 
theme of technology or skill, high levels of R&D as well as high 
levels of capital intensity, which are capable of serving the needs of a 
wide variety of products. These patterns suggest that synergy would 
be expected either through sharing the costs or skills. Wade and 
Gravill (2003) examine the relationship between corporate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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diversification and performance for Japanese subsidiaries in the 
information technology (IT) industry. Using data for more than 5 
years, they find that related subsidiaries out-perform unrelated 
subsidiaries on a number of dimensions including: performance, 
survival, and employee productivity growth. The results also support 
resource-based arguments suggesting that related diversification in 
knowledge-based industries, such as IT, plays a more important 
factor in firm success than in primary or secondary industries. In 
general, evidence seems to suggest that related diversification could 
provide some benefits to the firm,
b) Unrelated diversification: A firm is considered an unrelated-business 
diversifier when it grows by expansion into new products that require 
a new skill not evolving from the existing core skill Firms may 
acquire this new skill via merger or acquisition of an existing firm. 
Claims of synergistic benefits have also been made for unrelated 
diversification. Kframna and Palepu (2000) report that Chilean 
business groups in the 1988-1996 period benefited from their 
affiliation even though there were variations In magnitude. The net 
benefits of unrelated diversification were positive if group 
diversification exceeded a threshold level.
According to Wells (1984), much of the diversification, observed prior to World 
War II and for the period after the War through the end of the 195G’s, was related to a 
firm’s core area o f expertise. During the 1960’s, however, the pattern had changed
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significantly with the booming of conglomerates, the portfolio of unrelated businesses. 
Although the development of conglomerates has captured much of the attention of 
academics and market, the related form of diversification has played a major role in the 
long-term trend towards diversified firms.
An increasing number of diversified firms, however, have moved back towards 
focusing on a few key businesses. These firms had ventured into unfamiliar business 
territory and later found that there was less success than they had hoped. It could be 
argued that there is value in focusing on business areas in which they have well- 
established expertise. Also unrelated diversification might do more harm than good to 
the firm due to the complexity of operating in a wide range of business.
Palich, Cardinal and Miller (2000) examine how the degree of diversification 
affects a firm’s performance. Their results support the curvilinear model that moderate 
levels of diversification yield higher levels o f performance than either limited or 
extensive diversification. They also find that performance increases as firms shift from 
single-business strategies to related diversification, but performance decreases as firms 
change from related diversification to unrelated diversification.
Klein (2001) obtains the similar results. Using data from 36 large acquisitive 
conglomerates from 1966 to 1974 and industry-adjusted valuation, he finds that the 
conglomerates were less valuable and less profitable than stand-alone firms, favoring an 
agency explanation for unrelated diversification. In the 1960s, however, conglomerates 
were not valued at a discount. Evidence from acquisition histories suggests that 
conglomerate diversification may have added value by creating internal capital markets.
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Following theoretical and empirical work on diversification in the US and the 
UK, Lim and Teck (1995) investigate the relationship between diversification strategy, 
firm characteristics, and performance in Singapore. A sample of 41 publicly-listed 
Singapore companies that undertook different diversification strategies was studied over 
the period 1987-1991. The results, however, show that related diversification was not 
superior to unrelated diversification strategies in terms of their impact on performance.
Park (2002), on the other hand, studies the effects of a firm’s prior performance 
on the choice between related and unrelated diversification. His paper empirically tests 
whether there are any systematic ex ante performance differences between firms 
diversifying into related businesses and ones diversifying into unrelated businesses. The 
findings imply that ex post performance differences between related and unrelated 
diversifiers are largely attributed to the ex ante performance differences, not to 
diversification strategy per se.
The studies of diversification suggest that firms appear to benefit from focusing 
on their particular expertise. Thus material related, technological and market related 
diversification strategies emerge. These patterns confirm that synergy might be 
extracted, either through sharing costs or skills. Also the significant amount of unrelated 
diversification that has taken place should not be ignored, As the number of diversified 
firms increases, it could be argued that there is some superior efficiency of multi- 
business firms over stand-alone counterparts. In addition, firms that desire to maintain a 
satisfactory level of growth would diversify in order to looking for growth 
opportunities. In this case diversification policy, therefore, would also be beneficial as it
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increases the profit potential, leading to increase the value of the firm from the 
shareholders5 perspective.
Motives for diversification
There are two key factors that may force firms to diversify - resources and 
opportunities. The resource driven firm looks to apply its skills and excess resources 
into new areas of activity. The opportunity driven firm looks for the potential 
environment regardless of whether it is related to the firm’s core expertise. Whether a 
firm is resource driven or opportunity driven, the pattern of diversification is likely to 
be influenced by the opportunities available at that time.
According to Wells (1984), a firm does not pursue a single objective. He 
describes the firm’s behavior in terms of a hierarchy of needs similar to that postulated 
by Maslow. These needs are survival, security and growth.
1) Survival: When a firm’s particular industry is under threat, the concern will 
drive it into an escape diversification strategy. It is more likely to lead to 
unrelated rather than related diversification. In this case, there is more doubt 
whether escape diversification can create any tangible value to the firm. On 
the other hand, there is intangible value for management since the increased 
size of the firm and the prospect of higher growth opportunities provide a 
better management career path.
2) Security: Since operating in a volatile environment causes many problems, a 
firm may insulate itself from any discomfort created by the environment in 
which it operates. The two major sources of volatility come from demand 
and raw material prices. Therefore, a firm may undertake unrelated
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diversification to reduce volatility or backward integration to reduce supplier 
power. This strategy not only reduces its vulnerability to a volatile 
environment but also could create economic value to the firm by taking 
advantage of operating synergies.
3) Growth: To satisfy the higher needs, a firm will search for new business if 
its existing businesses do not offer a satisfactory level of growth. There is 
evidence suggesting that the growth objective could be claimed to be a 
driver of diversification by merger. When growth slows in the core business, 
the resource driven firm looks for related businesses to apply its skills and 
resources to maintain growth. The more aggressive opportunity firm is likely 
to look further with no apparent regard for the type of business, which may 
lead to the empire building.
Mechanisms for value creation
The objective of an economically rational firm is to maximize shareholders’ 
wealth. Thus, it will diversify if, by doing so it can increase its net present value, either 
by boosting operating cash flows or reducing its cost of capital. These are some possible 
benefits in which tangible economic value might be created by diversification.
1) Financial value creation: Related diversification could increase the net 
present value of a firm by reducing operating costs. Through diversification, 
a firm also could exploit imperfections in capital markets. Rather than 
distributing profits to shareholders, it could reinvest them into profitable 
projects that meet or exceed those that the shareholders might have chosen.
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By doing so, it could save a lot o f transaction costs that might be incurred in
the capital markets.
In addition, by diversifying into a number o f unrelated businesses, firms 
could reduce unsystematic risk associated with my one business as income 
steams are not perfectly correlated. This risk reduction could lower the cost 
of capital as well as cost of debt. As a result the value of the firm would be 
increased.
2) Economies o f expansion: When a firm expands by crossing subsidy the new 
business with the existing resources from well-established business units in 
its portfolio, it gains economic of expansion in that its current assets help 
achieving entry as well as building positions in new business area. Cross- 
subsidization involves transferring resources from one business unit to 
another, providing the firm an advantage over stand-alone firms. Penrose 
(1959) recognizes the ability of well-established firms to enter new 
industries more easily than newly created enterprise. She also argues that the 
existence of economies of expansion drove the continuing trend towards 
diversification.
Firms build on its current resources; the resulting diversification is likely to 
be related (in nature) in concentrated industries; the mode of diversification 
would also more likely to be direct entry rather than acquisition.
3) Market power: Firms may diversify in order to gain market power, 
sometimes resulting in reducing the level of competition. The phenomenon 
of market power in the diversification process is characterized by firms that
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seek to gain strategic advantage through size and diversity. A firm may 
counter an initial move by a competitor in one market by making an indirect 
move in another market However, counter-parry diversification is likely in 
industries where one might expect competitors to closely watch each other’s 
moves.
Firms also may decide to forward or backward integrate to lock up attractive 
suppliers or customers and prevent potential competitors from gaining 
access to materials or markets. This allows firms to exert partial monopoly 
power as well as increases the barriers to entry in an industry.
4) Operating synergy: Diversification allows firms to share the cost of certain 
activities as well as skills across a number of business units. A firm that is 
good at operating in high technology industries or in industries where 
marketing skills is the key may be able to create value through the transfer of 
its expertise by focusing on that business context as part of a diversification 
strategy. Thus, business units in a portfolio enjoying such synergy would be 
expected to be more profitable and valuable than if they were stand-alone 
business units.
Though there are several different motives for firms to diversify, the 
diversification patterns result from the behavioral motives -  expanding to satisfy their 
needs are not really different from the economic motives -  maximizing shareholder 
wealth. In reality, the intention to diversify seems to fall somewhere between the 
behavioral and economic motives. However, if the patterns of diversification are 
consistent with the motives, then it is more likely that value would be created.
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CHAPTER in  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
Why do firms diversify?
Corporate diversification has been widely believed to be inefficient. This 
strategy runs against one o f the oldest idea in economics, that specialization is 
productive. Amazingly, a number o f firms keep diversifying. There are several 
hypotheses to explain why firms diversify. Some assume that managers’ objective is to 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth. The decision to diversify, like any other investment 
decision, should be primarily motivated by the desire to increase stockholders’ wealth. 
Others assume that managers pursue a non-wealth maximizing behavior. They are 
motivated by a desire to increase firm’s size in order to maximize their own utilities 
rather than serve the interests of shareholders.
However, these are some benefits of corporate diversification that have been 
generally claimed.
I) Lower the risk o f investors. Under Markowitz’s Portfolio Theory, this 
benefit has barely existed, particularly in developed economies, as investors 
could reduce the variance of their investment returns by holding a diversified 
portfolio. Since stock returns are not perfectly correlated, the variability in 
returns o f one stock can help to offset that of another stock. In this way, the 
overall variance in a portfolio of uncorrelated stocks is reduced. Investors, 
who now have easy access to stocks of different industries, can diversify
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their portfolios across business segments more cheaply and easily than can 
managers.
However, in countries where stock markets are not well developed, investors 
need to rely on managers to reduce company-specific risk via diversification. 
This benefit, therefore, may exist.
2) Improve corporate ability to raise funds. Since diversified firms have 
earnings streams from several different segments, which are not perfectly 
related, their cash flows are relatively more stable than those of focused 
equivalent. The recent study by Kim, Kim and Pantzalis (2001) shows that 
both industrial and geographic diversification significantly reduce earnings 
volatility.
By reducing cash flow volatility, diversification tends to reduce the 
probability of default. Therefore, corporate diversification is likely to be 
preferable in the view of lenders since the cost o f financial distress is likely 
to be less. As a result, diversified firms might be able to increase their debt- 
equity ratio, which creates additional tax benefits and additional value.
3) Reduce employment risk. Managerialism is another explanation for 
diversification. Managers have an incentive to diversify the companies they 
control in order to reduce their employment risk. One reason is that large 
firms tend to provide managers with a greater degree o f job security. In 
addition, con-monetary rewards, such as power, prestige and perquisites, are
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usually easier to obtain when firms get larger. Finally, larger firms are 
usually pay higher salaries to their managers.2
Amihud and Baruch (1981)’s study supports this hypothesis. It reports that 
the operations of manager-controlled firms were found to be more 
diversified than those of owner-controlled firms regardless of means by 
which a firm achieved diversification. Morck, ScMeifer and Vishny (1990) 
also hypothesize that as a firm is increasingly diversified, it becomes more 
unique. Managers may increase the firm’s demand for particular skills by 
diversifying in the business consistent with their skills. As a result, 
management is more valuable to the firm and, therefore, they are able to 
demand greater compensation.
4) Increase operating efficiency. Economies of scope could be generated if  
firms’ assets are used to produce more than one goods or service. These 
assets include intangible assets such as goodwill, managerial expertise, 
technical knowledge, and existing market distribution systems. 
Diversification is also beneficial in allocating assets when demand of goods 
is seasonal or variable. Under the resource-based assumption, Silverman 
(1999) report that the technological resources of a firm significantly affect 
the firm’s diversification decisions in that it enters markets where its existing 
technological resources give it a competitive advantage.
2
According to Business Week, twenty years ago, CEOs made 40 times the average employee. Today 
it is 600. (Corporate Governance: Hie Road Back, New York; May 6,2002, Issue 3781, p i 16)
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However, Hendricks and Singhal (2001) study the relation between changes 
in operating income associated with effective implementation of total quality 
management (TQM) and various firm characteristics, including the degree of 
diversification. They find that more focused firms outperform more 
diversified firms.
The resource-based theory also argues that diversification results from 
excess valuable assets and capabilities that are transferable across industries. 
Under this circumstance, diversification creates synergies and becomes the 
efficient form of organizing economic activities. According to Matsusaka 
(2001), firms are composed of organizational capabilities, particularly the 
skills and abilities of top and middle management, which can be profitable in 
multiple businesses. To some degree they are transferable across products 
and industries. These capabilities are so valuable that firms may be better off 
if they diversify in order to find a new product or industry that well matches 
their management’s abilities. Therefore, corporate diversification could 
enhance firm performance if it allows firm’s divisions to share existing 
strategic assets and to transfer the competence to create another efficient 
one. Also when a firm’s existing businesses are down but not yet out, it is 
safer to maintain the old businesses while searching for a better opportunity 
instead of liquidating and throwing all resources into a new venture with 
totally uncertain prospects.
If firms operated in the perfect market, under the assumptions of frictionless 
markets, no taxes, no transaction costs, costless information, riskless borrowing and
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lending, and rational utility-maximizing agents, corporate diversification should not 
have had any effect on firm value. To examine whether diversification may affect firm 
value, researchers certainly focus on market imperfections, whether on information 
asymmetries between inside managers and outside investors, some types of prineipal- 
agent problem, or other violations of those assumptions. Diversification, by itself, 
cannot produce an increase or decrease in firm value.
Agency theory
Agency problems are basically the primary reason in explaining why firms 
diversify. Jensen and MecWing (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract under 
which the principle^) hire the agent to act on their behalf, which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent. Agency theory is the analysis of the 
conflicting relationship between shareholders and corporate managers. Managers are 
basically the agents of shareholders. The theory, however, assumes that managers have 
incentives to expand the firm beyond the optimal size since growth increases managers’ 
power by increasing the resources under their control.
Agency costs are the costs of resolving the conflicts of interests between 
managers and shareholders. These costs are defined as the sum of the monitoring costs 
of the shareholders, such as auditing, formal control systems, budget restrictions, and 
the incentive fees paid to the managers (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 1996). It could be 
expected that contracts will be devised so that it will provide the managers with 
appropriate incentives to maximize the shareholders’ wealth. However, it is possible 
that managers may not act in the best interests of shareholders. Shareholders, therefore, 
may experience residual losses, the lost wealth of the shareholders due to divergent
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■behavior of the managers. Whenever the agency relationship exists, monitoring and 
bonding costs as well as residual loss are unavoidable. The magnitude of the costs 
varies from firm to firm, depending on the tastes of managers for non-pecuniary 
benefits, the costs of monitoring and bonding activities, and the costs of replacing the 
managers.
The agency view of diversification is based on the idea that due to widely 
dispersed stock ownership, individual shareholders have neither incentive nor the ability 
to monitor and discipline managers. The emergence of professional managers also 
makes modem corporations autonomous of outside forces and run in the interest of its 
managers, who care little for shareholders. Diversification allows managers to pursue 
their personal objectives, ranging from luxury company cars, office furniture, empire 
building, protecting their specific human capital from firm risk, to entrenchment. 
Diversification is viewed as a way to advance these personal goals instead of to 
maximize shareholder value. Management tends to increase the size of firms even if  
doing that may reduce firm value. It could be implied that the virtual objective of 
managers is to maximize the corporate wealth, the wealth over which they have 
effective control and closely associated with corporate growth and corporate size. 
Undoubtedly, increased growth and size are not necessarily the same thing as increased 
shareholders’ wealth. In sum, agency theory sees diversification as a mean through 
which managers can pursue their own interests by expanding firms at the expense of 
shareholders.
Using free cash flow hypothesis, Jensen (1986) explains how agency costs play 
a key role on the diversifying acquisitions of the oil companies in the 1970s. Free cash
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flow is defined as cash flow in excess of that required to funding all positive net present 
value projects. When a firm generates positive cash flow, management may either 
reinvest that cash or distribute it to shareholders. Paying out this cash flow to 
shareholders reduces resources under managers’ control, which reducing their power. It 
also increases risk from being monitored by the market if they have to use external 
financing to fund new projects. However, he argues that managers are more likely to act 
in their own interests or tend to waste this free cash flow. They will either use the funds 
to consume perquisites or to invest in any project that may not provide adequate returns 
to shareholders since executives firms tend to have a higher level of compensation when 
firms get larger. During 1970s changes in the energy market generated large increases 
in free cash flow in this industry whereas reduction in demand required a shrinking of 
the industry. Consistent with the agency costs of free cash flow, management did not 
pay out the excess cash flow to shareholders. They continued spending a lot of money 
on exploration and development activities as well a s. on diversification outside the 
industry even though average returns were below cost of capital.
Lament (1997) studies investment of non-oil subsidiaries of oil companies when 
the oil price decreased in 1986. His results are consistent with Jensen’s free cash flow 
hypothesis that firms with large free cash flow tend to be overinvestors and subsidize 
underperforming segments.
Amihud and Lev (1981), who focus on risk- averse behavior among managers, 
point out that the private benefits associated with managers’ personal risk reduction are 
likely to increase with their equity ownership. When managers perceive that their
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personal wealth is tied closely to the fortunes of the firm, it is more likely that they try 
to diversify the firm to a degree that become detrimental to shareholders.
Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) provide evidence on the agency costs explanation 
for the excessive diversification of U.S. companies in the 1980s, which contrasting with 
Amibud and Lev (198 l) ’s view that as managers own more of the firm’s equity, they 
tend to diversify due to their greater need for personal risk reduction. Denis at el. 
(1997), however, find a strong negative relation between the extent of diversification 
and managerial equity ownership. This negative relation holds over time even after 
controlling for other well-known factors related to the level of diversification, such as 
firm size, firm-specific knowledge (R&D/Saies) and information asymmetries between 
managers and investors (the number of analysts following that firm). Using a sample o f 
933 firms selected in 1984, their findings support the hypotheses that agency problems 
are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies and that 
the general increase in refocusing in the 1980s can be attributed to increased monitoring 
associated with the market for corporate control. However, there is little evidence that 
the value loss from diversification, as estimated using Berger and Ofek (1995)’s excess 
value, is related to either managerial or outside blockholder ownership.
Internal capital market theory
This source of financing comes from internally generated cash flows, defined as 
net income plus depreciation minus dividends. They are an important source of funds 
over which firms have control. From historical U.S. financing patterns, internally 
generated cash flows have dominated as a source of financing. (Ross at el., 1996)
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Typically, between 70 and 90 percent o f long-term financing comes from cash flows 
that companies generate from operations.
The internal capital market theory is relatively related to the portfolio planning 
approach. Portfolio planning is characterized by firms that diversify into a variety of 
businesses and utilize funds from their mature businesses to finance the growth of new 
businesses. When the growth in the new business slows, it becomes the cash generator 
that will finance the next generation of new business opportunities. The portfolio 
approach (see Appendix II), developed in the early 1960’s, is widely used in corporate 
planning. Particularly in corporate diversification, it involves the creation of an internal 
capital market that benefits firms, with a mix of business units at various stages in life 
cycle, by reducing the cost of debt as well as other transaction costs. Diversified firms 
with a balanced portfolio, therefore, can take a boarder view of resource allocation 
decisions whereas stand-alone businesses may find it relatively more difficult to raise 
funds to support their growth.
Internal capital markets, however, differ from external capital markets in many 
aspects such as information, incentives, control rights and transaction costs. External 
financing, actually, cannot be a perfect substitute for internal funds due to greater costs. 
Asymmetries of information between managers and outside investors cause the new 
potential shareholders to demand compensation for not knowing about the investment 
projects as much as does the management. Inevitably, this would increase the cost of 
issuing new shares over the opportunity cost of internal financing. According to the 
pecking order theory developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), the order of preference for 
a firm when looking for funds are internal funds, debt issue and share issue. When the
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internally generated funds run out, a debt issue will be preferred. Share issues will lastly 
be used after the capacity to issue debt has been exhausted. The importance of internal 
financing, however, significantly increases in economies where external funds are 
limited or not available.
When the external capital market fail to allocate resources in an efficient manner 
or managers are unable to credibly signal to the external capital market the value of a 
particular project, managers may attempt to create an internal capital market in order to 
resolve this capital constraint. Hubbard and Palia (1999), who study the 1960s 
conglomerate wave, report that there is strong evidence to support the financing synergy 
hypothesis. One of many motivations for corporate diversification, therefore, stems 
from the inability to obtain financing for profitable projects. The existence of internal 
capital market also allows firm to have control over the set o f investment projects, 
which is more likely to be preferable to put them under scrutiny of external capital 
markets.
Creating an internal capital market can benefit a firm if this source of fund is 
reallocated efficiently. Since managers have better information about the success of 
firms’ projects than investors, therefore, as long as they use this information truthfully, 
i.e. to funding the highest marginal return projects or high productivity rather than low 
productivity businesses, there will be efficiency gain from internal capital allocation. 
Billett and Mauer (2002) show that diversified firms can increase firm value if internal 
capital is transferred to divisions with above-industry-average return on assets that 
would be financially constrained if  these divisions were single-segment firms.
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According to Stein (1997), with information asymmetries and agency problems 
between managers and investors, firms can be financially constrained. But diversified 
firms that are able to alleviate some of the information asymmetries and agency 
problems can raise external capital at a lower cost if  they can send a message to 
investors about the ability to efficiently reallocate their internal capital. In this case, 
diversification can be a value enhancing strategy. He shows that diversified firms are 
able to raise more external capital than focused firms, and doing that will increase firm 
value. Thomas’s (2002) findings also support this hypothesis. He reports that diversified 
firms have lower measures of information asymmetries and that there is a negative 
relationship between these measures and excess value.
Billett and Mauer’s (2000) findings also support the role of internal capital 
markets. They developed a model o f equity restructuring that illustrates the linkages 
between firm value and the value of internal capital markets using a relatively new form 
of corporate restructuring called tracking stock. Tracking stock announcements offer a 
unique opportunity to directly observe the market’s assessment o f the value of a 
diversified firm’s internal capital market. The diversified firms in their sample have 
rejected the antidiversification trend in favor of tracking stock equity structures that 
allow for many of the benefits o f more focused firms while simultaneously preserving 
their internal capital markets.
However, the value-effect of diversification as an internal capital market may 
have changed as capital markets has become more sophisticated and the earlier 
information deficiencies of external capital markets are substantially reduced.
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Hypothesis
This study hypothesizes that the need of funds to finance profitable investments 
is the main reason for firms in emerging countries to diversify. Corporate diversification 
allows firms to exploit internal capital markets where external financing is costly or 
unavailable to obtain. Moreover, diversification helps management efficiently redeploy 
the assets that are performing poorly. Since these funds can be transferred from segment 
to segment more easily, they create comparative advantage to diversified firms over 
standalone counterparts. As a result, diversification would be value-enhancing strategy.
Although there is evidence indicating that corporate diversification is not 
beneficial in developed countries such as the U.S., firms in emerging markets may gain 
from existing imperfections in these capital markets. Firms would take advantage from 
higher level of information asymmetries in these economies by creating an internal 
capital market and exploiting it through corporate diversification. According to Stein 
(1997), the more severe the asymmetric information, the higher cost differential 
between internal and external financing. In other words, imperfections in capital 
markets and information asymmetries increase the cost of external financing over 
internal financing. Diversification allows firms to gain the advantage of using funds 
from divisions with high cash flows but poor investment opportunities to finance 
divisions with low cash flow but good investment opportunities.
However, market imperfections and high asymmetric information allow 
management and controlling shareholders to easily exploit the firm for their own 
interests (Jensen, 1986). It is more likely that diversified firms are not operated in order 
to maximize shareholders’ wealth. Poor corporate control, as well as crony capitalism,
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which is widespread among poorly developed markets also raises agency problems. 
Therefore, the agency costs associated with diversification also increase.
To investigate which approach is better in explaining the market reaction: the 
efficient internal market or the agency costs hypothesis, this study looks at the 
difference of market valuation between focused firms and diversified firms. I f  the value 
of diversified firms is higher than that offocused firms, it implies that the benefits from  
exploiting internal capital markets exceed the agency costs. The internal capital market 
approach, therefore, dominates the agency costs hypothesis. On the other hand, if  
diversified firms trade at discount relative to focused firms, it could be concluded that 
the agency costs overwhelm the benefits of diversification at firm level. Then, the 
agency costs hypothesis is more pronounced.
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY
Basically, this study is similar to Lins and Servaes (2002) in that it focuses on 
emerging markets, particularly in Asian countries. However, there are three important 
differences between these two studies. First, Lins and Servaes (2002)’s sample 
integrates all seven emerging countries: Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Korea and Thailand, whereas I study three countries: Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines, separately. Second, due to studying across different 
countries, Lins and Servaes (2002) need to convert financial data into U.S. dollars 
whereas all data used in this study are reported in their own currency. The results, 
therefore, will not be contaminated by exchange rate discrepancy as well as differences 
in accounting practice and tax system. Finally, Lins and Servaes’s is a one-year study 
(1995) but this study will be based on data from 1992-2001 to see whether the transition 
of capital markets affects the market valuation of diversification.
A. Cross-section analysis
In order to compare the results with their work, first, I follow the models used in 
Lins and Servaes’ (2002) paper. To test whether internal capital markets or agency costs 
play more important role, two cross-sectional regression models are used to examine the 
difference in market valuation between focused firms and diversified firms.3
Excess market value = a  + ^(Diversification dummy) + s (1)
3 Whenever heteroskedasticity exists, White standard errors are used to correct the problem in order to 
avoid invalidating hypothesis tests.
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Excess market value = a  + {^(Diversification dummy) + p2 (Size) +
^(Profitability) + P4 (Growth) + p5(Leverage) + s (2)
where:
Excess market value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the actual market value 
to the imputed market value. Using the methodology proposed by Berger and Ofek 
(1995), the imputed market value is computed as follows:
a) Use only the data from focused firms to compute the median of market-to-sales in 
each two-digit SIC code industry.
b) For diversified firms, the imputed value is computed by multiplying their sales in 
each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then 
summing across all segments.
c) For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product o f their sales and their 
corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios.
Both extremely high and low imputed values are considered to be outliers and 
excluded from the analysis.
Diversification dummy is equal to one if a firm operates in two or more segments, 
where a segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.
Profitability is the ratio of operating income to sales.
Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales.
Leverage is the ratio of total debts to total assets.
The coefficient Pi is the measure of the diversification valuation. It can be either 
positive or negative. A positive coefficient indicates that diversified firms are more
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valuable than focused firms, implying that the internal capital market is efficient. 
Therefore, the internal capital market hypothesis works. A negative coefficient would 
signify that the agency costs overwhelm benefits of diversification. Consequently, the 
agency costs hypothesis is more powerful.
Size, profitability, growth and leverage are control variables that may affect the 
value of the firm. According to the three-factor Fama-French model, size has a 
significant impact on required rate of return. Firms with different size, therefore, could 
be valued differently by investors. Likewise, differences in valuation may be related to 
differences in profitability, It is likely that high-profitable firms would have higher 
market value than do low-profitable ones.
Undoubtedly, growth expectation has an important role in stock valuation. It 
may also explain the portion of valuation differences. Finally, since it is also possible 
that firms with high debt are in financial distress, the leverage ratio is included in the 
model to examine whether the valuation difference is partly due to difference in debt.
B. Panel data analysis
According to Greene (2000), the analysis of panel or longitudinal data is the 
subject of one of the most active and innovative bodies o f literature in econometrics, 
since panel data provide a rich environment for the development of estimation 
techniques and theoretical results. Researchers are able to use time-series cross- 
sectional data to examine issues that could not be studied in either cross-sectional or 
time-series settings alone. Panel data sets are more oriented toward cross-section 
analysis. They are wide but typically short. Fixed effects or differences across units are 
the integral part as well as the key of the analysis. Time effects are often viewed as
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transitions or discrete changes of state. They are typically modeled as specific to the 
period in which they occur and are not carried across periods within a cross-sectional 
unit. The fundamental advantage of a panel data set over a cross section is that it allows 
the researcher greater flexibility in modeling differences in behavior across individuals.
Due to the inconclusive findings about how markets value diversification, panel 
data are introduced in the analysis. Campa and Kedia (2002) hypothesize that firm 
characteristics, which make firms diversify, may cause the discount. They find that 
when controlling for the endogeneity of the diversification decision, the diversification 
discount always drops. Sometimes it turns into premium.
This section extends the earlier cross-sectional results by first running ordinary 
least squares using panel data.
y it = a  + SDi + fixit + sit (3)
where: y it is the excess market value o f firm i at time L 
D j  is diversification dummy.
Xu is a vector of the control variables of firm i at time t. In this study 
there are four control variables: firm size, profitability, growth and 
leverage.
This model provides consistent and efficient estimates o f a  and fi, which are the 
same across all firms.
Then this study takes advantage of the availability of panel data to estimate 
fixed-effects. It examines whether a diversification discount still exists after controlling 
for firm-specific effects. The framework for this discussion is a regression model as 
follows:
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yu =  at +  SDi +  ftcit +  sit (4)
where the individual effect is ai, which is to be constant over time t and specific 
to the individual firm i. This model allows to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
among firms.
The sample
Worldscope database used in this study provides detailed financial information 
on companies from more than 50 countries. Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines 
have been selected for this study since these emerging countries’ capital markets have 
been changed substantially during 1992-2001. Also these three countries are similar in 
terms of market infrastructure, business culture as well as economic and political 
system. To be consistent to previous research, a firm is defined as diversified when it is 
reported sales in two or more industries, defined by the two-digit SIC code, and the 
firm’s primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales. In some cases where 
the segment in business description differs from the SIC code, the SIC code is corrected 
to be consistent with the business description. The sample consists of companies whose 
primary businesses are not financial services and/or who do not diversify into the 
financial industry. Diversified firms with no single-segment firms operating in the same 
industry and those that do not report sales by segment are also excluded. Table la, lb 
and 1c present the sample selection procedure.
Based on 2001 fiscal year, Thailand’s final sample includes 369 firms. Sixty- 
three of them are diversified firms. As shown in Table la, not only is the number of
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firms in this study more than twice as many as Lins and Servaes (2002)’$, the rate of 
diversification is significantly larger than:-17% compare to 10% in their study.
TABLE la  
Sample Selection as of 2001 fiscal year
This Lins and
Thailand study Servaes’*
No of firms listed on Worldscope 434 252
Subtract:
a. Firms whose primary business is financial services (56) (65)
b. Firms diversified in the financial services industry (1) (8)
c. Firms classified as diversified that do not report sales by (8) (16)
segment
Final sample 369 163
No. of focused firms 306 146
No. of diversified firms** (%) 63(17%) 17(10%)
* Their data are based on 1995 fiscal year.
** A firm is classified as diversified if  it operates in more than one segment, defined 
by a two-digit SIC code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% 
of total sales.
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Table lb is the final sample o f Indonesia, which includes 83 diversified firms 
and 184 focused firms. The total sample is 267 firms which is more than three times 
Lins and Servaes’ sample. The rate of diversification is also much larger, 31% 
compared to 20% in their study. It is the highest rate among three countries in this 
study.
TABLE lb
Sample Selection as of 2001 fiscal year
This Lins and
Indonesia study Servaes’*
No of firms listed on Worldscope 324 120
Subtract:
a. Firms whose primary business is financial services (40) (26)
b. Firms diversified in the financial services industry (0) (2)
c. Firms classified as diversified that do not report sales by (17) (9)
segment
Final sample 267 83
No. of focused firms 184 66
No. of diversified firms** (%) 83(31%) 17(20%)
* Their data are based on 1995 fiscal year.
** A firm is classified as diversified if  it operates in more than one segment, defined 
by a two-digit SIC code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% 
of total sales.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
The Philippines is the only country that is not presented in Lins and Servaes’ 
study.4 Its final sample of 179 firms (shown in Table 1c) includes 30 diversified firms 
and 149 focused firms. The number of firms who diversify into the financial service 
industry is much larger than the first two countries. However, after those firms are 
dropped, the rate of diversification is 17%, which is the same rate as Thailand’s.
TABLE 1c 
Sample Selection as of 2001 fiscal year
The Philippines The sample
No of firms listed on Worldscope 223
Subtract:
a. Firms whose primary business is financial services (27)
b. Firms diversified in the financial services industry (11)
c. Firms classified as diversified that do not report sales by segment (6)
Final sample 179
No. of focused firms 149
No. of diversified firms** (%) 30(17%)
** A firm is classified as diversified if it operates in more than one segment, defined 
by a two-digit SIC code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% 
of total sales.
4 At that time the Philippines has less than 100 firms listed on Worldscope. So it was not included in their 
study.
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Summary statistics and excess value measures over the period of study axe 
reported in Table 2. (1992-2001 for Thailand and 1994-2001 for Indonesia and the 
Philippines5)
Table 2a: Thailand
Panel A shows that focused firms significantly outperformed diversified firms 
four out of ten years (1992-2001) in terms of mean and five out of ten in terms of 
median. Over ten-year period of study, diversified firms, on average, trade at a 8.4% 
discount compared to focused firms. In both groups, the excess market values vary 
considerably from 693% below to 561% above imputed market value for focused firms 
and from 368% below to 729% above for diversified firms.
Diversified firms are, in terms of median (shown in Panel B), significantly larger 
than focused firms in every year during the study period (1992-2001). Surprisingly the 
largest firm in the sample is the focused firm. Both are not much different in 
profitability (Panel C). Consistent with the hypothesis that diversification reduces 
earnings volatility, except for 1995 and 2000; the operating income to sales of 
diversified firms varies in lower range than that of focused firms. Growth, represented 
by the capital expenditure-to-sales ratio (Panel D), of diversified firms is significantly 
higher than that o f focused firms, in terms of median. This is inconsistent with the 
argument that firms seek for diversification when they lack growth opportunities. 
Actually, four out of ten years (1993, 1997, 2000 and 2001) diversified firms
5 The samples o f these two countries during 1992-1993 fiscal year are too small as at least two focused 
firms in each two-digit SIC code are needed to compute median in order to do the analysis.
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significantly have higher growth than focused firms. Finally, even though diversified
firms have significantly higher debt than focused firms. During 1992-2001 leverage 
ratios of diversified firms and focused firms are, on average, are not much different 
(approximately 5% for both mean and median). Focused firms seem to have no problem 
in seeking debts to financing their profitable investment.
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TABLE 2a
Descriptive Statistics and Excess Market Values Measures:
Thailand
A, Excess market values
Year
Mean MedBan Minimal® Maximum
F D F D F D F D
1992 0.075 0.146 0 0.208 -0.862 -2.224 1.906 1.935
1993 -0.010 0.072 0 0.033 -1.657 -1.906 5.610 1.773
1994 0.030 0.145 0 0.045 -1.846 -3.097 3.861 3.191
1995 -0.025 -0.013 0 -0.056 -2.874 -2.239 3.229 3.310
1996 -0.097 -0.165 0 -0.267 -2.702 -2.226 3.816 2.862
1997 -0.064 -0.300 0 -0.389 -3.353 -3.521 3.448 3.253
1998 -0.151 -0.486 0 -0.559 -3.156 -3.689 3.180 2.525
1999 -0.081 -0.456 0 -0317 -3.108 -2.210 1.993 3.390
2000 -0.054 -0.351 0 -0372 -3.404 -2.879 3.084 7.293
2001 -0.086 -0.446 0 -0308 -6.932 -2.293 2.973 6.923
1992-
2001
-0.062 -0.146 0 -0.199 -6.932 -3.689 5.610 7.293
Excess M arket Value is the natural log of the ratio of the actual market value to the imputed market 
value. For diversified firms, the imputed value is computed by multiplying their sales in each segment 
by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all segments. For 
focused firms, the imputed market values axe the product of their sales and their corresponding 
industry median market-to-sales ratios.
F : Focused firms 
D ; Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if  it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit 
SIC code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales.
The bold numbers mean that the differences between diversified and focused firms are significant at 
10% or less.
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Table 2a Continued
B. Sizes Total assets (million bahts)
Year
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
F D F D F D F D
1992 3640 5942 1245 3745 59 961 114888 40902
1993 4662 6577 1537 4072 61 230 113244 57532
1994 5954 8889 1706 4658 64 845 123192 57792
1995 7972 11099 2417 6129 301 920 127502 52350
1996 9055 14834 2860 6136 386 881 177645 108194
1997 10856 19421 3335 5355 306 706 319148 175499
1998 8867 24693 2862 5690 294 607 150112 291252
1999 22234 21912 3197 5164 298 440 1181685 252267
2000 8673 15234 2283 4199 91 350 235976 240423
2001 7648 13585 1845 3592 56 222 289069 219906
1992-
2001
9316 15001 2356 4829 56 222 1181685 291252
F : Focused firms 
D : Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit SIC 
code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales.
The bold numbers mean that the differences between diversified and focused firms are significant at 
10% or less.
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Table 2a Continued
C. Profitability: Operating Income/sales (%)
Year
Mean Median Min maul Maximum
F D F D F D F D
1992 10.02 15.32 10.51 12.01 -398.16 -20.84 67.45 55.70
1993 0 3 7 15.85 8.90 13.95 -689.79 -24.58 72.77 84.51
1994 7.58 14.45 9.99 12.74 -199.10 -28.26 77.76 73.82
1995 9.56 -11.76 8.74 7.35 -49.31 -993.57 72.52 47.29
1996 5.31 4.25 6.66 11.31 -335.46 -168.37 73.27 38.87
1997 -13.74 -18.04 6.24 7.13 -2542.77 -305.65 173.82 38.55
1998 -21.11 -5.48 4.16 4.98 -2315.33 -481.18 57.53 394.33
1999 -57.37 -98.11 5.51 6.72 -7883.14 -2360.47 64.64 41.70
2000 0.39 -45.24 5.43 3.78 -182.6 -2334.21 67.55 35.33
2001 -4.29 -8.43 5.28 5.18 -447.51 -212.68 90.43 31.79
1992-
2001
-8.25 -17.50 7.20 7.49 -7883.14 -2360.47 173.82 394.33
F : Focused firms
D : Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit SIC 
code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales.
The bold numbers mean that the differences between diversified and focused firms are significant at 
10% or less.
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Table 2a Continued
D. Growth: Capital expenditure/sales (%)
Year
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
F D F D F D F D
1992 29.19 50.62 12.10 17.86 0 0.15 680.53 277.93
1993 64.37 69.42 8.96 13.38 0 0.27 4150.56 703.48
1994 23.53 20.60 11.12 8.32 0 0.06 427.66 144.55
1995 23.58 23.38 9.79 10.48 0.28 0.14 1032.43 111.31
1996 23.84 40.25 7.99 11.00 0 0.55 312.16 1029.84
1997 17.08 23.68 5.19 9.08 0.08 0.19 143.49 277.73
1998 10.56 19.44 2.29 2.94 0 0 221.15 368.90
1999 5.22 12.97 2.51 2.91 0 0 95.01 151.07
2000 11.00 8.03 3.00 4.49 0 0.09 1061.10 75.38
2001 7.20 8.17 3.37 4.50 0 0 146.84 50.07
1992-
2001
19.83 24.33 4.98 6.12 0 0 4150.56 1029.84
F : Focused firms
D : Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if  it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit SIC 
code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales.
The bold numbers mean that the differences between diversified and focused firms are significant at
10% or less.
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Table 2a Continued
E. Leverage: Total debts/total assets {%)
Year
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
F D F D F p F P
1992 33.65 36.96 34.00 43.54 0 0.28 67.86 70.01
1993 35.86 35.95 37.70 34.12 0 0.09 81.79 72.79
1994 35.33 37.41 36.82 40.19 0 0 88.43 82.68
1995 40.49 41.55 42.03 42.81 0 0.01 112.87 67.74
1996 42.90 41.97 46.58 45.20 0.02 0 112.96 71.58
1997 55.21 55.49 55.07 58.63 0 0.01 303.33 110.68
1998 49.26 52.94 50.27 55.21 0 0 346.55 129.91
1999 47.05 53.64 41.86 53.18 0 0 424.31 196.78
2000 57.09 67.58 38.67 46.65 0 0 2593.89 787.66
2001 42.84 6837 32.70 39.79 0 0.77 730.42 838.19
1992-
2001
45.29 51.48 41.00 45.33 0 0 2593.89 838.19
F : Focused firms 
D : Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if  it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit SIC 
code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales.
The bold numbers mean that are the differences between diversified and focused firms significant at 
10% or less.
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Table 2b: Indonesia
Similar to Thailand’s, focused firms significantly outperformed diversified
firms, particularly in the last four years (1998-2001). (See Panel A) The average amount 
of discount over eight years of study is 43.1%, which is much larger than Thailand’s. 
But the excess market values for both groups move in narrower range than those of 
Thailand.
In terms of assets, diversified firms are, on average larger than focused firms 
(See panel B). Differences in size started being significant in 1998. Focused firm is also 
the largest firm in the sample. Unlike Thailand’s, over eight-year period focused firms 
in Indonesia are significantly more profitable (Panel C) However, focused firms also 
have much higher earnings volatility, varying considerably from -19083% to 2864% 
compared to -981% to 96% of diversified firms. There is no difference in terms of 
growth between two groups (Panel And). From 1994 to 2001, diversified firms in 
Indonesia have significantly higher level of debt (an average of approximately 17% 
over eight-year period) than focused firms do (Panel E).
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TABLE 2b
Descriptive Statistics and Excess Market Values Measures:
Indonesia
A. Excess m arket values
Year
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
F D F D F D F D
1994 -0.053 -0.154 0 0.210 -2.474 -2.323 1.555 2.955
1995 0.042 0.095 0 0.351 -2.845 -1.940 2.173 2.763
1996 -0.013 0.117 0 0.209 -3.623 -2.171 1.907 4.414
1997 -0.048 -0.433 0 -0.216 -3.270 -3.501 3.200 3.591
1998 -0.041 -0.676 0 -0.595 -4.329 -4.979 3.956 4.111
1999 -0.053 -0.369 0 -0.175 -3.291 -1.864 4.503 1.843
2000 -0.101 -0.661 0 -0.759 -4.870 -3.735 3.189 4.884
2001 0.045 -0.787 0 -0.794 -5.182 -5.042 4.703 3.722
1994-
2001
-0.013 -0.444 0 -0.446 -5.182 -5.042 4.703 4.884
Excess Market Value is the natural log of the ratio of the actual market value to the imputed market 
value. For diversified firms, the imputed value is computed by multiplying their sales in each 
segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all 
segments. For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product of their sales and their 
corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios.
F : Focused firms 
D : Diversified films
A firm is classified as diversified if it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit 
SIC code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales.
The bold numbers mean that the differences between diversified and focused firms are significant at 
10% or less.
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Table 2b Continued
B. Sizes Total assets (million Rupiahs)
Y e a r
Mean Median M in im u m Maximum
F D F D F D F D
1994 541885 804707 189740 247972 21815 46415 4505786 5556406
1995 1118652 1147741 329786 445972 19137 59108 15912499 8205010
1996 1316536 1172163 515354 615011 28130 82592 17783199 5265450
1997 2059546 2379660 1054508 1199853 30633 92737 29168150 10010772
1998 2436044 3119700 666212 1722444 37861 101784 43170310 22319828
1999 2336817 2622270 912871 1222155 689 13966 42761306 20666176
2000 1761102 1949451 424274 800578 10031 10442 55786408 25544767
2001 1967460 1930505 484709 78*809 24118 16873 58213407 24614142
1994-
2001
1739628 2061514 481670 993746 689 10442 58213407 25544767
F s Focused firms 
D : Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if  it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit SIC 
code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales.
The bold numbers mean that the differences between diversified and focused firms are significant at 10%
or less.
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Table 2b Continued
C. Profitability: Operating Income/sales {%)
Year
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
F D F ]& F D F D
1994 16.27 16,19 15.90 13.43 1.29 1.87 43.23 33.60
1995 16.76 15.49 14.42 13.72 -19.84 1.48 67.21 32.97
1996 15.66 11.45 14.77 12.33 -29.48 -9.33 64.59 28.02
1997 9.17 7.54 14.77 13.30 -210.98 -195.38 57.81 53.18
19 98 -206.99 -30.08 15.36 9.93 -17326.03 -981.93 57.62 59.25
1999 -45.67 -34.38 8.89 6.96 -6579.12 -711.8 47.40 47.70
2000 -40.18 -2.54 9.20 8.25 -9321.63 -300.41 2864.41 96.30
2001 -170.88 -1.54 6.46 6.47 -19083.77 -202.22 51.67 49.97
1994-
2001
-60.60 -6.12 11.82 9.04 -19083.77 -981.93 2864.41 96.30
F : Focused firms 
D : Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if  it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit
SIC code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% o f total sales.
The bold numbers mean that axe the differences between diversified and focused firms significant at 
10% or less.
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Table 2b Continued
D. Growth: Capital expenditure/sales {%)
Year
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
F D F D F D F D
1994 16.92 39.13 10.82 7.26 0.22 1.45 95.70 584.00
1995 17.06 17.10 9.36 8.24 1.10 1.08 144.98 117.46
1996 22.26 34.79 11.73 13.00 0.43 1.60 110.04 453.14
1997 32.62 44.61 10.19 10.84 0.52 0.60 321.85 316.20
1998 31.54 13.94 5.62 5.77 0 0.17 617.91 109.05
1999 6.73 5.15 3.02 3.14 0 0 67.95 42.66
2000 11.11 11.07 3.37 3.66 0 0.03 241.49 206.57
2001 11.43 6.00 4.03 3.86 0 0.12 493.53 70.25
1994-
2001
17.25 17.52 6.02 5.23 0 0 617.91 584.00
F : Focused firms 
D : Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit SIC 
code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales.
The bold numbers mean that are the differences between diversified and focused firms significant' at 
10% or less.
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Table 2b Continued
E. Leverage: Total debts/total assets (%)
Year
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
F D F D F D F D
1994 24.51 33.50 24.63 37.21 0 6.07 56.36 62.44
1995 31.06 38.71 31,17 39,93 0 7.88 74.19 62.24
1996 33.57 41.61 33.29 41.23 0 15.79 96.69 68.25
1997 46.52 60.08 49.37 61.98 0 0 113.17 84.2
1998 56.41 71.12 51.00 67.68 0 0 251.67 156.38
1999 50.27 61.40 50.28 57.17 0 0 221.17 206.45
2000 45.79 61.66 35.90 55.82 0 0 486.96 277.82
2001 42.48 59.10 29.08 48.48 0 0 221.85 313.68
1994-
2001
4 1 3 8 58.82 37.19 53.17 0 0 486.96 313.68
F : Focused firms 
D : Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit SIC 
code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales.
The bold numbers mean that are the differences between diversified and focused firms significant at 
10% or less.
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Table 2c: The Philippines
The Philippines5 results are quite different from the first two countries. From 
Panel A focused firms in the Philippines started significantly outperforming diversified 
firms in 1994, three years before the crisis. The average discount o f 59.8% is also much 
larger, particularly compared to 8.4% of Thailand. So is its variability, which ranging 
from 672% below to 675% above imputed market value for focused firms and from 
952% below to 263% above for diversified firms.
Similar to Thailand’s, focused firms, on average, are relatively small in terms of 
assets (Panel B). The largest firm is also the focused firm. Diversified firms are 
apparently more profitable (Panel C). The median of operating income-to-sales, the 
proxy for profitability, over the study period (1994-2001) is almost twice as that of 
focused firms. Again, the income volatility o f focused firms varies in much wider range 
than that of diversified firms. There is no significant difference in growth between these 
two groups (shown in Panel D). Diversified firms, on average, have significantly higher 
debt than focused firms (Panel E). But the amount of debt is approximately half of those 
of the other two countries. This probably is one of many reasons that the 1997 crisis had 
a minimal effect on the Philippines, compared to Thailand and Indonesia.
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TABLE 2c
Descriptive Statistics and Excess Market Values Measures:
Philippines
A. Excess market values
Year
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
F D F D F D F D
1994 -0.147 -0.941 0 -1.062 -4.898 -2.922 2.274 1.156
1995 -0.056 -0.449 0 -0.310 -3.315 -2.628 2.220 1.065
1996 0.078 -0.537 0 0.131 -3.592 -2.963 5.633 1.255
1997 -0.020 -0.441 0 -0.022 -2.704 -3.290 3.672 1.735
1998 -0.288 -1.564 0 -0.377 -6.722 -9.523 3.716 1.807
1999 -0.251 -0.564 0 -0.089 -4.112 -3.855 3.220 1.568
2000 -0.020 -0.600 0 -0.489 -4.255 -4.258 5.935 2.325
2001 0.085 -0.631 0 -0.594 -4.199 -5.082 6.755 2.637
1994-
2001
-0.055 -0.653 0 -0.307 -6.722 -9.523 6.755 2.638
Excess Market Value is the natural log of the ratio of the actual market value to the imputed 
market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value is computed by multiplying their sales in 
each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across 
all segments. For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product of their sales and their 
corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios.
F : Focused firms 
D : Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit 
SIC code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales.
The bold numbers mean that the differences between diversified and focused firms are significant 
at 10% or less.
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Table 2c Continued
B. Size: Total assets (million Pesos)
Year
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
F D F D F D F D
1994 7196 14650 2029 5413 146 1065 82297 72194
1995 7522 14543 3272 5885 137 1099 104961 86963
1996 9973 21379 4683 8904 139 1183 128075 98905
1997 12911 30647 5579 12271 135 1120 194434 135825
1998 13637 33504 5718 14525 421 1106 231697 139043
1999 12641 35953 4639 15460 46 1059 243729 137116
2000 11114 29768 2593 9160 41 1073 328496 152270
2001 10384 32144 2273 9282 49 261 307622 162725
1994-
2001
10909 27692 3430 9752 41 261 328496 162725
F : Focused firms 
D : Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit
SIC code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales.
The bold numbers mean that are the differences between diversified and focused firms significant at 
10% or less.
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Table 2c Continued
C. Profitability; Operating income/sales (%)
Year
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
F D F D F D F D
1994 3.72 22.30 11.14 15.84 -153.76 1.65 59.58 51.08
1995 8.70 24.08 14.12 23.04 -120.20 0.20 82.84 48.89
1996 -268.71 20.80 13.38 24.66 -19879.86 -14.99 71.21 55.71
1997 -26.29 14.90 10.18 16.71 -936.09 -72.60 72.38 60.07
1998 -826.96 7.19 5.38 11.67 -48470.75 -148.82 60.04 78.89
1999 -152.94 12.52 1.61 13.55 -4047.85 -40.99 64.64 64.59
2000 -83.24 -37.49 4.21 8.18 -2730.71 -1069.15 1862.07 39.82
2001 -1002.05 -183.50 3.80 4.97 -80046.81 -4462.09 59.59 50.19
1994-
2001
-342.73 -25.17 7.48 13.29 -80046.81 -4462.09 1862.07 78.89
F : Focused firms 
D ; Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit 
SIC code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% o f total sales.
The bold numbers mean that the differences between diversified and focused firms are significant at
10% or less.
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Table 2c Continued
D. Growth: Capital expenditure/sales (%)
Year
Mean Median Miniimum Maximum
F D F D F D F D
1994 37.34 12.72 16.57 10.86 0 0.69 260.49 37.30
1995 38.46 25.90 15.18 24.05 0.65 1.52 344.98 124.95
1996 67.88 25.12 18.17 17.14 0 2.49 1644.93 69.61
1997 61.17 44.35 26.79 30.18 0.44 2.56 604.62 258.16
1998 371.18 34.58 16.01 20.56 0 0 19537.79 195.27
1999 38.44 9.35 6.29 5.08 0 0 1015.72 37.03
2000 28.84 13.65 6.21 6.32 0 0 875.34 48.46
2001 373.55 56.32 6.22 8.50 0 0.38 33055.32 1023.53
1994-
2001
139.31 29.67 10.52 13.30 0 0 33055.32 1023.53
F : Focused firms 
D : Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if  it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit SIC 
code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales.
The bold numbers mean that the differences between diversified and focused firms are significant at 
10% or less.
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Table 2e Continued
E. Leverage: Total debts/total assets (%)
Year
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
F D F D F D F D
1994 14.50 23.08 l i . f l 21.14 0 0 76.65 63.90
1995 19.09 26.02 14.99 22.92 0 0 64.07 69.06
1996 22.09 25.24 19.62 25.88 0 0 65.82 61.44
1997 25.93 37.08 23.48 39.62 0 0 68.71 60.07
1998 25.94 32.05 23.96 28.51 0 0 70.32 28.51
1999 28.95 30.22 24.59 27.87 0 0 105.16 62.84
2000 26.25 28.38 2.035 26.72 0 0 203.24 70.11
2001 22.93 24,91 15.30 23.09 0 0 106.42 71.89
1994-
2001
24.02 28.68 19.47 28.16 0 0 203.24 76.93
F : Focused firms 
D : Diversified firms
A firm is classified as diversified if  it operates in more than one segment, defined by a two-digit 
SIC code industry, and its primary segment accounts for less than 90% of total sales.
The bold numbers mean that die differences between diversified and focused firms are significant at 
10% or less.
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In conclusion, Thailand is the largest sample with the total of 369 firms, 
followed by Indonesia 267 firms and the Philippines 179 firms. The rate of 
diversification of 31% in Indonesia is much higher, compared to 17% in Thailand and 
the Philippines. But the number of extreme values is much less than in those two 
countries. The Philippines’ sample has the most extreme values. It is interesting that 
whereas the number of firms in the Philippines is less than half of those in Thailand, the 
diversification discount apparently became significant long before the crisis.
Diversified firms normally are larger than focused firms. But it is not conclusive 
that firms can exploit diversification strategy to gain synergy from their business units. 
Even though diversification may not increase profitability, it seems to be able to reduce 
earnings volatility, which is consistent with Kim, Kim and Pantzalis (2001). Their study 
shows that both industrial and geographic diversification significantly reduce earnings 
volatility. However, there is not much difference in growth between diversified and 
focused firms. Seeking growth may not be the key driver of diversification. There may 
be some other incentives for firms to diversify. As argued by Wells (1984), firms may 
take diversification strategy in order to survive or insulate themselves when they are 
operating in the threatening or volatile environment. Finally, focused firms seem to 
have no disadvantage in seeking debts to financing their profitable investment. The 
difference in the average amount of debt between these two groups is not really large.
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS
There are three parts to the analysis. First data are analyzed by country as well 
as the total sample in order to be able to compare with Lin & Servaes’ study. Then they 
are divided into 2 sub-periods to see the difference in market valuation between before 
and after the crisis. Second, data in each country are analyzed by year to observe the 
transition (if any) over the period of study. Finally, panel data analysis is performed to 
see if there is any difference in the results.
A. Results by country
To examine whether there is any difference in market valuation between 
diversified firms and focused firms, first OLS regression is performed for each 
countries as well as the total sample, which includes all 3 countries. The results are 
reported in Table 3.
Panel A of Table 3 shows the relationship between valuation differences and 
diversification over the study period (1992-2001 for Thailand and 1994-2001 for 
Indonesia and the Philippines). Ignoring the effect of other variables, there is no 
evidence of diversification discount in Thailand over the 10-year period of study. 
However, there are significantly large amount of discounts in Indonesia and the 
Philippines, 43.1% and 59.8% respectively. When all countries are included in the 
analysis, the diversification discount still exists with the average of 30.2%.
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TABLE 3
Differences in market valuation between diversified firms and focused firms
A. The model: Excess market value = a  + (^(Diversification dummy) + e
Excess Market Value is the natural logarithm o f the ratio o f the actual market value to the 
imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value is computed by multiplying their sales in 
each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all 
segments. For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product of their sales and their 
corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios.
Diversification dummy is equal to one if  a firm operates in two or more segments, where a 
segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
The p-vahies of each variable are shown in parentheses.
a) Significant at 1%.
b) Significant at 5%.
c) Significant at 10%.
Thailand*
1992-2001
Indonesia*
1994-2001
Philippines*
1994-2001
Total*
Intercept -0.067 -0.014 -0.055 -0.049
(,006)a (.736) (.354) (,016)b
Diversification dummy -0.084 -0.431 -0.598 -0.302
(.195) (.000)a (.000)“ (.000)“
p-value of the model .132 .000“ .000* .000“
Adjusted R2 .001 .025 .026 .012
Number of observations 1897 1179 715 3791
* White’s correction for heteroskedasticity
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Table 3 continued
B, The model: Excess market value = oc + {^(Diversification dummy) + p2(Size)
+ {^(Profitability)* {^G row th) + p5(Leverage) + s
Excess Market Value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the actual market value to the 
imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value is computed by multiplying their sales in 
each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all 
segments. For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product o f their sales and their 
corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios.
Diversification dummy is equal to one if a firm operates in two or more segments, where a 
segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
Size is the log of total assets.
Profitability is the ratio of operating income and sales.
Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure and sales.
Leverage is the ratio of total debts and total assets.
The p-values of each variable are shown in parentheses.
a) Significant at 1%.
b) Significant at 5%.
c) Significant at 10%.
--------------------— £.----1--------hit  ------------- ----------------------------------------------------- - ..... ' It.  -..................... .............. ...................................................a---------------------------------  37—--
Thailand*
1992-2001
Indonesia*
1994-2001
Philippines*
1994-2001
Total’
Intercept -0.226 -0.047 -1.181 -0.216
(.522) (.924) (.101) (J88)c
Diversification dummy -0.151 -0.255 -0.601 -0.293
(.023)b (.006)a (.000)“ (.000)*
Size 0.009 0.011 0.083 0.011
(.785) (.645) (,084)c (.335)
Profitability - 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.001
(.978) (.601) (.624) (.141)
Growth 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.004
(.000)“ (.000)a (.077)* (.000)"
Leverage -0.001 -0.007 -0.012 -0.003
(.835) (.0©0)a (.000)* (.200)
p-value of the model jo r .000“ .000s .000*
Adjusted R2 .055 .121 .049 .053
Number o f observations 1725 1050 600 3375
* White’s correction for heteroskedasticity
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However, after taking into account of size, profitability, growth and leverage, 
the results are somewhat different. As shown in Panel B of Table 3, there axe significant 
differences in market valuation between diversified and focused firms in every country 
including the overall sample. On average, diversified firms are valued 60 ,1%  lower than 
focused firms in the Philippines and 25.5% lower in Indonesia. Diversification discount 
in Thailand is also significant but quite small. Diversified firms in this country trade, on 
average, at discount of 15.1%. The average diversification discount for the total sample 
is 29.3%.
Growth is the only factor that has positively significant effect on market 
valuation in every country. The ratio of capital expenditure and sales, which is the 
proxy for growth, signals the good news to the market. The magnitude is relatively 
small, though, compared to the corporate diversification effect. One percent of an 
increase in capital expenditure-to sales ratio could add value from 0.1% - 0.6% to firms.
As expected, leverage is negatively related to market valuation. Debt is 
somewhat not good news, contributing 1.2% valuation discount in the Philippines and 
0.7% in Indonesia. But there is no significant effect of debts on market valuation in 
Thailand.
Size does matter only in the Philippines. Larger firms gain from market 
valuation over smaller ones. For overall sample, there is no evidence that size, in terms 
of assets, has any impact on firm value.
Not surprisingly, profitability is totally ignored by the market since accounting 
profits are considered the historical cash generating ability. They also tend to be
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distorted by various problems such as accounting practices, asset valuation and
inflation.
Table 4 is the comparison between this study’s results and Lins and Seryaes’. 
Both data are based on 1995 fiscal year. The difference is that Lins and Servaes’ sample 
consists of seven countries; Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South 
Korea and Thailand whereas this study includes three countries; Thailand, Indonesia 
and the Philippines. Since very few firms in this study diversify internationally, 
geographic diversification is not included in the analysis.
Both results are quite different. Whereas Lins and Servaes find that diversified 
firms trade at 5.9% discount (significant at 10%) compared to focused counterparts, in 
this study there is no evidence of difference in market valuation between two groups in 
1995. They also find that profitability has a significant effect on market valuation. And 
the magnitude of impact is considerably large, an average o f 79.3%. But in this study 
the profitability coefficient is insignificant. Growth is the only variable that is 
significant in both studies but the magnitude in Lins and Servaes’ study is much higher, 
80.6% compared to 0.3% in this study.
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TABLE 4
Comparison between the 1995 result and Lins and Servaes’
The model: Excess market value = a  + ^(Diversification dummy) + p2 (Size)
+ ^(Profitability) + p4 (Growtfa) + Ps(Leverage) + £
Excess Market Vaiue is the natural log o f the ratio of the actual market value to the imputed market 
value. For diversified firms, the imputed value is computed by multiplying their sales in each segment 
by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all segments. For 
focused firms, the imputed market values are the product o f their sales and their corresponding industry 
median market-to-sales ratios.
Diversification dummy is equal to one if  a firm operates in two or more segments, where a segment is 
defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
Size is the log of total assets.
Profitability is the ratio of operating income and sales.
Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure and sales.
Leverage is the ratio o f total debts and total assets.
The p-values of each variable are shown in parentheses.
a) Significant at 1%.
b) Significant at 5%.
c) Significant at 10%.
This study* Lins &  Servaes’
Intercept -1.145 -0394
(.000)° (0.00)*
Diversification dummy -0.111 -0.059
(.357) (0.08)'
Size 0.073 0.015
(.000)“ (0.17)
Profitability 0.004 0.793
( .175) (0.00)*
Growth 0.003 0.806
(.000)* (0.00)*
Leverage -0.005
(.024)b
Geographic diversification 0.056
(0.15)
p-value of the model .000" n.a.
Adjusted R2 .099 .07
Number of observations 345 1009
* White’s correction for heteroskedasticity
Note: This study includes Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines whereas Lins& Servaes’ sample 
consists of 7 countries; Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand.
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Next, the sample is divided into 2 sub-periods, prior to the crisis (1992-2001 for 
Thailand and 1994-2001 for Indonesia and the Philippines) and after the crisis (1997- 
2001)6. In Panel A of Table 5 are prior-to-the-crisis results. The diversification discount 
exists only in the Philippines with the average of 39.6%. Also no significant difference 
is found when all 3 countries are included in the study.
However, the results in Panel B are somewhat different. Even though there is no 
evidence of diversification discount in Thailand and Indonesia, the average of 17.5% 
significant discount is found for the total sample.
Again growth is the only variable that has significant impact on market 
valuation in all three countries as well as the overall sample. The magnitude is small 
too, only 0.3% -0,6% premium with an increase of 1% in capital expenditure-to- sales 
ratio.
Both coefficients of size and profitability are positively significant in Indonesia 
and the Philippines. But for overall sample, there is not enough evidence to conclude 
that profitability has any effect on market valuation. The coefficients of leverage are 
also significant but negative as expected for in the Philippines and overall sample.
6 After excluding 1997 data from the sample, I rerun regression for both prior-to and after the crisis. The 
results are similar the ones presented in Tables 5 and 6.
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TABLES
Differences in m arket valuation between diversified firms and focused firms
(Prior to the crisis)
A. The model: Excess market value = a + pi (Diversification dummy) + e
Excess Market Value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the actual market value to the 
imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value is computed by multiplying their sales in 
each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all 
segments. For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product of their sales and their 
corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios.
Diversification dummy is equal to one if a firm operates in two or more segments, where a 
segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
The p-values of each variable are shown in parentheses.
a) Significant at 1%.
b) Significant at 5%.
c) Significant at 10%.
Thailand*
1992-19%
Indonesia*
1994-19%
Philippines
1994-1996
Total*
1994-1996
Intercept -0.019 0.012 -0.087 -0.024
(.585) (.841) (.293) (.456)
Diversification dummy 0.029 0.043 -03% -0.078
(.737) (.787) (.023)b (-317)
p-vakte of the model .713 .745 .023b .269
Adjusted R2 .001 .003 .021 .000
Number of observations 782 308 201 1083
* White’s correction for heteroskedasticity
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Table 5 continued
B. The model: Excess market value = a  + ^(Diversification dummy) + p^Stze)
+ fJ3(Profitability)+ p4{Growth) + ^Leverage) + s 
Excess M arket Value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the actual market value to the 
imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value is computed by multiplying their sales in 
each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all 
segments. For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product of their sales and their 
corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios.
Diversification dummy is equal to one if a firm operates in two or more segments, where a 
segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
Size is the log of total assets.
Profitability is the ratio of operating income and sales.
Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure and sales.
Leverage is the ratio o f total debts and total assets.
The p-values of each variable are shown in parentheses.
a) Significant at 1%.
b) Significant at 5%.
 c) Significant at 10%.______________  _________ ___
Thailand"
1992-1996
Indonesia*
1994-1996
Philippines*
1994-1996
Total*
1994-1996
Intercept -0.547 -3397 -2.981 -0.758
(.101) (J00)a (.001)* (.000)*
Diversification dummy -0.031 0.185 -0.490 -0.175
(.725) (.222) (.010)* (.026)b
Size 0.038 0.160 0.183 0.042
(.119) (.000)* (.004)* (.§00)*
Profitability 0.000 0.023 0.008 0.004
(.916) (.000)“ (.010)* (.148)
Growth 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.004
(.000)“ (.061)* (.001)* (.000)*
Leverage -0.003 -0.008 -0.013 -0.003
(.117) (,©30)b (.004)* (J71)e
p-value of the model JO T .000* .000* .000*
Adjusted R2 .101 .185 .204 .106
Number o f observations 729 267 178 984
* White’s correction for heteroskedasticity
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The results of 1997-2001 are presented in Table 6, It is found that the results are 
much more conclusive. As shown in Panel A, the diversification dummy coefficient is 
significant in every country as well as overall sample.
The difference in market valuation between diversified firms and focused firms 
is largest in the Philippines’ market (65.6%), followed by Indonesia’s (54.8%) and 
Thailand’s (15.9%). For the total sample, the average diversification discount of 41.5% 
is also found.
Even though after controlling for size, profitability, growth and leverage, the 
diversification discount still exists and remains significant. (See Table 6 Panel B) The 
magnitude of discount for overall sample is 36%, which is much larger compared to 
5.9% found in Lins and Servaes’ study. There is an approximately 20% increase of 
discount in the Philippines from Panel A results. Indonesia, on the other hand, the 
discount decreases from 54.8% in Panel A to 33.2% in Panel B. Introducing more 
variables into the analysis obviously affects the results.
The effect of remaining variables is similar to the earlier tables. Except for size, 
the coefficient is negatively significant for Indonesia. But for overall sample it remains 
positive and significant. There is no evidence that profitability could create value. 
Growth signals the good news to the market whereas investors evaluate debts as the bad 
news.
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TABLE 6
Differences in market valuation between diversified firms and focused firms
(After the crisis)
A. The model: Excess market value = a + ^(Diversification dummy) + e
Excess Market Value is the natural logarithm of the ratio o f the actual market value to the 
imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value is computed by multiplying their sales in 
each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all 
segments. For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product of their sales and their 
corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios.
Diversification dummy is equal to one if  a firm operates in two or more segments, where a 
segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
The p-vaiues of each variable are shown in parentheses.
a) Significant at 1%.
b) Significant at 5%.
c) Significant at 10%.
Thailand*
1997-2001
Indonesia
1997-2001
Philippines
1997-2001
Total*
1997-2001
Intercept -0,099 -0.024 -0.062 -0.065
(.002)“ (.658) (.408) (.018)b
Diversification dummy -0.159 -0.548 -0.656 -0.415
(.Q76)c (.000)“ (.001)* (.000)*
p-value of the model ,035b .000“ .000* .000“
Adjusted R2 .003 .038 .026 .020
Number of observations 1130 873 513 2516
* White’s correction for heteroskedasticity
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Table 6 (continued)
B. The model: Excess market value = a  + (^(Diversification dummy) + p2(Size)
+ ^(Profitability)-*- (J4(Growth) + (35(Leverage) + e 
Excess Market Value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the actual market value to the 
imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value is computed by multiplying their sales in 
each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all 
segments. For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product of their sales and their 
corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios.
Diversification dummy is equal to one if a firm operates in two or more segments, where a 
segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
Size is the log of total assets.
Profitability is the ratio of operating income and sales.
Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure and sales.
Leverage is the ratio of total debts and total assets.
The p-values of each variable are shown in parentheses.
a) Significant at 1%.
b) Significant at 5%.
  c) Significant at 10%. ________________ ____________  __
Thailand*
1997-2001
Indonesia
1997-2001
Philippines*
1997-2001
Total*
1997-2001
Intercept -0.182 1,344 -0.963 -0.249
(.686) (J24)b (.257) (.093)°
Diversification dummy -0.167 -0.332 -0.843 -0.360
(J90)c (.002)“ (.000)“ (.000)*
Size 0.008 -0.058 0.075 0.027
(.816) (.053)c (.186) (.002)’
Profitability 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(.286) (.493) (.844) (.957)
Growth 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.003
(.024)b (.000)’ (J43)b (.000)’
Leverage -0.002 -0.007 -0.016 -0.009
(.377) (.000)’ (.000)’ (.000)’
p-value of the model .000’ .000“ .000’ .000’
Adjusted R2 .040 .131 .089 .108
Number of observations 1060 770 435 2265
* White’s correction for heteroskedasticity
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B. Results by year
Using annually data, OLS regression for each country is also performed in order 
to see whether market valuation varies from year by year. The results are presented 
separately by country in Table 7.
Thailand. Over ten-year period of study (1992-2001), only in 2000 that there is 
significant discount between diversified firms and focused firms, with the average of 
29.7% as shown in Panel A of Table 7a7.
After controlling for size, profitability, growth and leverage, however, 
diversified firms started trade at significant discount of 41.3% in 1998, one year after 
the crisis. (See Table 7a Panel B) These discounts have remained significant until 2001. 
There is no trend in magnitude of the discount. But from 1992-2001, diversified firms in 
Thailand, on average, trade at significant discount of 15.1%.
Growth is the variable that is consistently significant over ten-year period with 
the exception of 1999. Value of a firm could be increased by less than 1% when capital 
expenditure-to-sales ratio, the proxy of growth, increases by 1%. The coefficient of debt 
or leverage is also consistently significant from 1994 to 2001. Size remains its 
significance since 1998. Unlike growth, the magnitude of premium for large firms over 
small ones is relatively large (10%-15%). However, both size and leverage lose the 
significance when combining data over ten-year period. Profitability gains significance 
only in 1993 and 1997 with the small magnitude of 1.9% and 0.5% respectively.
7 Actually, the coefficients in 1998,1999 and 2000 are also significant before using White standard errors 
to correct for heteroskedasticity
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TABLE 7a 
Differences in market valuation between diversified firms and focused firms
A. The model: Excess market value - a  + (^(Diversification dummy) + s
Excess Market Value is the natural log of the ratio of the actual market value to the imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value is 
computed by multiplying their sales in each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all
segments.
For focused firms, the imputed maricet values are die product of their sales and their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios. 
Diversification dummy is equal to one if  a firm operates in two or more segments, where a segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry. 
Size is the log o f total assets.
The p-values of each variable are shown in parentheses, a) Significant at 1%. b) Significant at 5%. c) Significant at 10%.
Thailand 1992* 1993 1994* 1995 1996 1997* 1998* 1999* 2000 2001 Total*
Intercept 0.075
(.324)
-0.011
(.902)
0.030
(.674)
-0.025
(.738)
-0.097
(.215)
-0.064
(.453)
-0.151
(.079)'
-0.072
(.313)
-0.037
(.613)
0.044
(.507)
-0.067
(0.006)“
Diversification
dummy
0.071
(.747)
0.082
(.675)
0.115
(.567)
.012
(.941)
-0.068
(.676)
-0.236
(.279)
-0.335
(.110)
-0.375
(.106)
-0.297
(•064)'
-0.360
(.101)
-0.084
(.195)
p-value of the model .690 .675 .496 ,941 .676 .212 .073' .036b .064' .034b .132
Adjusted R2 -.011 -.006 -.003 -.005 -.004 .003 .012 .019 .008 .012 .001
Number of 
observations
77 131 173 196 205 196 186 179 287 282 1897
* White’s correction for heteroskedasticity
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Table 7a (Continued)
B. The model: Excess market value =  a  + pjfDiversification dummy) + p2(Size) + ^(Profitability)-)- ^(Growth) + p5(Leverage) + £
Excess Market Value is the natural log of the ratio of the actual market value to the imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed 
value is computed by multiplying their sales in each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all 
segments.
For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product of their sales and their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios. 
Diversification dummy is equal to one if a firm operates in two or more segments, where a segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry. 
Size is the log of total assets.
Profitability is the ratio of operating income and sales.
Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure and sales.
Leverage is the ratio of total debts and total assets.
Thailand 1992 1993* 1994^ 1995* 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001*
— ;----
Total
Intercept 1.385
(.123)
0.186
(.847)
-1.887
(.023)”)
-1.419
(.140)
-0.767
(•352)
-0.047
(.958)
-1.346
(.101)
-1.682
(J29)b
-1.149
(.053)'
-1.529
(.002)“
-0.226
(.522)
Diversification dummy 0.151
(.389)
-0.164
(.421)
-0.152
(.438)
-0.177
(.257)
-0.239
(.148)
-0.224
(.212)
-0.413
(.016)b
-0.276
(.089)'
-0364
(.006)"
-0.244
(-095)'
-0.151
(.023)b
Size 0.108
(.105)
0.042
(.564)
0.134
(.021)b
0.102
(.164)
0.053
(.353)
0.032
(.606)
0.122
(.030)b
0.150
(.005)*
0.100
(.016)b
0.125
(.000)*
0.009
(.785)
Profitability 0.008
(.158)
0.019
(.000)*
0.002
(•729)
0.008
(.255)
0.005
(.142)
0.005
(.04S)b
0.002
(.312)
-0.005
(.225)
-0.000
(.914)
0.000
(.987)
-0.000
(.978)
Growth 0.006
(.000)*
0.003
(.000)*
0.009
(.001)*
0.003
(.000)*
0.004
(.000)*
0.009
(.000)*
0.008
(.000)*
0.005
(.404)
0.001
(.060)'
0.009
(.01 l)b
0.003
(.000)*
Leverage -0.002
(.606)
-0.002
(.567)
-0.007
(J27)b
-0.007
(.058)*
-0.007
(.047)b
-0.014
(.000)“
-0.016
(.000)*
-0.015
(.000)*
-0.012
(.000)*
-0.013
(.000)*
-0.001
(.835)
p-value of the model .004“ .000* .000* .000* .000* .000“ .000* .000“ .000* .000* .000“
Adjusted R2 .170 .150 .145 .124 .110 .191 .285 .168 .194 .178 .055
Number of observations 69 121 158 186 195 190 178 170 268 254 1725
* White’s correction for heteroskedasticity
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Indonesia. The results in Panel A of Table 7b are somewhat different from 
Thailand’s. The differences in market valuation between diversified and focused firms 
have been significant since 1998. The magnitude of discount from year to year is 
relatively large, ranging from 31.6% to 83.2%.
However, when taking into account other variables, the magnitude of these 
discounts is reduced considerably. (See Table 2b Panel B) The average discount over 
eight years (1994-2001) of 43.1% in Table 2b Panel A reduces to 25.5% in Panel B. 
T he diversification discount becomes significant in 2000 rather than in 1998 as shown 
in Panel A.
Like Thailand, growth and leverage both share some contribution in market 
valuation. The amount of their impact is also relatively small, compared to the 
diversification effect. Unlike Thailand, profitability significantly adds some value 
(1.5%-3.7%) to firms from 1994-1997. Its significance has been lost after the crisis. The 
coefficient of size is positively significant in 1995 but turns to be negatively significant 
in 20018. From 1994-2001, there is no evidence that either size or profitability has any 
effect on firm value.
8 The coefficient of size becomes negatively significant for the first time. It happens only once throughout 
the study.
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TABLE 7b 
Differences in market valuation between diversified firms and focused firms
A. The model: Excess market value = a  + {31(Diversification dummy) + s
Excess Market Value is the natural log of the ratio of the actual market value to the imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed 
value is computed by multiplying their sales in each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all 
segments.
For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product of their sales and their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios. 
Diversification dummy is equal to one if a firm operates in two or more segments, where a segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry. 
Size is the log of total assets.
The p-values of each variable are shown in parentheses, a) Significant at 1%. b) Significant at 5%. c) Significant at 10%.
Indonesia 1994* 1995* 1996* 1997* 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total*
Intercept -0.053
(.631)
0.105
(.316)
-0.031
(.732)
-0.048
(-711)
-0.042
(.799)
0.020
(-862)
-0.101
(.276)
0.045
(-685)
-0.014
(.736)
Diversification dummy -0.101
(.757)
0.053
(.841)
0.130
(.606)
-0.385
(.196)
-0.635
(.019)b
-0.316
(.087)c
-0.560
(.001)"
-0.832
(.000)*
-0.431
(•000)*
p-value of the model .699 .820 .529 .151 J1 9 b .087c .001* .000* .000“
Adjusted R2 -.012 -.009 -.005 .008 .032 .012 .051 .070 ,025
Number of observations 74 107 127 133 141 159 215 225 1179
* White’s correction for heteroskedasticity
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Table 7b (Continued)
B. The model: Excess market value = a  + (B](Diversification dummy) + p2(Size) + p3(Profitability)+ j}4(Growtb) + (35(Leverage) + s
Excess Market Value is the natural log of the ratio of the actual market value to the imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value 
is computed by multiplying their sales in each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all segments. 
For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product of their sales and their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios. 
Diversification dummy is equal to one if a firm operates in two or more segments, where a segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry. 
Size is the log of total assets.
Profitability is the ratio of operating income and sales.
Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure and sales.
Leverage is the ratio of total debts and total assets.
 The p-values of each variable are shown in parentheses, a) Significant at 1%. b) Significant at 5%. c) Significant at 10%.____________________
Indonesia 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Intercept
Diversification dummy
Size
Profitability
Growth
Leverage
p-value o f the model 
Adjusted R2 
Number o f observations
-2.604 -4.878 -2.125
(.156) (.001)“ (-159)
-0.082 0.229 0.259
(.763) (.314) (-246)
0.101 0.258 0.085
(•313) (.002)“ (.286)
0,037 0.015 0.021
(.006)* (.092)' (-011)b
0.002 0.006 0.004
(.242) (.174) (-061)'
-0.002 -0.016 -0.001
(.715) (.011)b (.815)
J18b .000“ .001*
.134 .210 .138
65 94 108
-1.229 -0.330 -0.495
(.513) (.868) (.700)
-0.219 -0.422 -0.246
(.438) (.174) (.192)
0.056 0.022 0.049
(.555) (-817) (.453)
0.017 0.000 -0.006
(J29)b (.643) (-376)
0.007 0.008 -0.001
(.005)“ (.014)” (.941)
-0.011 -0.008 -0.008
(.048)b (.013)“ (.009)“
.001“ .000“ .028“
.133 .147 .056
113 123 137
1.043 4.070 -0.047
(.325) (.000)“ (.924)
-0.337 -0.577 -0.255
(-034)“ (.003)“ (.006)“
-0.041 -0.185 0.011
(.446) (.001)“ (.645)
-0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(.481) (.368) (.601)
0.021 0.001 0.006
(.000)“ (.808) (.000)“
-0.009 -0.008 -0.007
(.000)“ (.000)“ (.000)“
.000“ .000“ .000“
.270 .208 .121
188 209 1050
*  White’s correction for heteroskedasticity
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The Philippines. From earlier results, the Philippines’ sample yields quite 
different results from the other two countries. It is not a surprise to find that the discount 
apparently becomes significant starting from 1994. Table 7c (Panel A) shows that there 
is evidence of diversification discount five out of eight year of study (1994-2001). The 
magnitudes of discounts are much higher than Indonesia, They range from 39.3% in 
1995 to 127.6% in 1997, the crisis year. The average over eight years is 59.8%, which is 
16.7% higher than that of Indonesia. The variability of diversification discount does not 
change much when controlling for size, profitability, growth and leverage. (As shown in 
Table 7c Panel B)
The effects of the other variables are similar to Thailand and Indonesia, in terms 
of both sign and magnitude. During 1994-2001, large firms, on average, trade at 
premium compared to small ones. Growth has positively significant effect whereas 
leverage has negatively significant effect on market valuation. Finally, profitability does 
not play a significant role in adding value to a firm.
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TABLE 7c
Differences in market valuation between diversified firms and focused firms
A. The model: Excess market value = a  + {^(Diversification dummy) + e
Excess Market Value is the natural log of the ratio of the actual market value to the imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value 
is computed by multiplying their sales in each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all segments. 
For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product o f their sales and their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios. 
Diversification dummy is equal to one if  a firm operates in two or more segments, where a segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
Size is the log of total assets.
The p-values of each variable are shown in parentheses, a) Significant at 1%. b) Significant at 5%, c) Significant at 10%.
Philippines 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998* 1999* 2000 2001 Total*
Intercept -0.147 -0.055 0.206 -0.020 -0.287 -0.113 0.180 0.086 -0.055
(.480) (.635) (.140) (.907) (.149) (.356) (.234) (.603) (.354)
Diversification dummy -0.794
(.070)'
-0.393
(.089)'
-0.459
(.142)
-0.421
(.194)
-1.276
(.078)'
-0.313
(.357)
-0.580
(.096)'
-0.716
(.056)'
-0.598
(.000)“
p- value o f the model .070' .089' .142 .194 .018'’ .265 .096' .056' .000“
Adjusted R2 .055 .027 .014 .008 .055 .003 .014 .021 .026
Number o f observations 43 73 85 86 84 89 127 127 715
* White’s correction for heteroskedasticity
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Table 7c (Continued)
B. The model: Excess market value = a + { (^Diversification dummy) + p2(Size) + ^(Profitability)-!- (34(Growth) + ps(Leverage) + s
Excess Market Value is the natural log of the ratio of the actual market value to the imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value is 
computed by multiplying their sales in each segment by their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios, then summing across all segments.
For focused firms, the imputed market values are the product of their sales and their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios. 
Diversification dummy is equal to one if a firm operates in two or more segments, where a segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
Size is the log of total assets.
Profitability is the ratio of operating income and sales.
Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure and sales.
Leverage is the ratio of total debts and total assets.
Philippines 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998* 1999* 2000* 2001 Total*
Intercept -4.612
(.051)'
-1.821
(.209)
-1.595
(.332)
-2.115
(.264)
-5.234
(.089)'
0.324
(.819)
0.323
(.844)
-0.028
(-984)
-1.181
(.101)
Diversification dummy -1.033
(.029)b
-0.398
(.115)
-0.398
(•195)
-0.598
(.071)'
-1.681
(.031)b
-0.454
(.262)
-0.690
(.074)'
-0.574
(.100)'
-0.601
(.000)“
Size 0.290
(.064)'
0.128
(.194)
0.108
(.329)
0.114
(.359)
0.364
(.089)'
-0.033
(.723)
-0.009
(.930)
0.025
(.804)
0.083
(.084)'
Profitability 0,012
(.280)
0.001
(.874)
0.001
(.885)
0.000
(.814)
0.001
(.123)
0.007
(.042)b
0.000
(.926)
0.002
(.346)
0.000
(.624)
Growth 0.011
(.017)b
0.004
(.098)'
0.004
(.024)b
0.004
(.085)'
0.002
(.116)
0.007
(.064)'
0.009
(.001)*
0.007
(.019)b
0.001
(.077)'
Leverage -0.012
(.102)
-0.016
(J 1 4 f
-0.010
(.164)
-0.002
(.755)
-0.031
(.090)'
-0.003
(.619)
-0.012
(.048)b
-0.017
(.033)b
-0.012
(.000)*
p-value o f the model .005” .037“ .120 .167 .012b .092' .007“ .023b .000*
Adjusted R2 .296 .108 .052 .040 .126 .062 .104 .078 .049
Number o f  observations 38 65 75 74 77 75 105 104 600
' White’s correction for heteroskedasticity
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C. Panel data results
Table 8a, 8b and 8c present the results from panel data analysis for Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines, respectively. Model (a) is similar to OLS regression. So 
it provides the same results as reported in Panel B of Table 3. The coefficients in Model 
(b) show their effects on market valuation after controlling for firm-specific effects 
(fixed effects).
For Thailand, both OLS and panel data analyses provide similar results. (See 
Table 8a) Diversification dummy is significant with the average discount of 18.6% for 
panel data analysis, 3.5% more than OLS regression. Growth also significantly adds 
value to firms even though the magnitude is very small (0.1% for panel data, compared 
to 0.3% for OLS). The coefficients of size, profitability as well as leverage are not 
significant in either models.
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TABLE 8a
Differences in market valuation 
between d i v e r s i f i e d  firms and focused firms 
(Panel data analysis)
The Models: (a) yu =» a  + SDt + fixu +
(b) y„ = a, + SD, + fk u + su
where: yu is the excess market value of firm i at time t. Excess Market Value is the natural logarithm of
the ratio of the actual market value to the imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value
is computed by multiplying their sales in each segment by their corresponding industry median market- 
to-sales ratios, then summing across all segments. For focused firms, the imputed market values are the 
product of their sales and their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios.
Di is Diversification dummy, which is equal to one if  a firm operates in two or more segments, 
where a segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
Xu are the four control variables of firm / at time t. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Profitability is the ratio of operating income and sales. Growth is the ratio o f capital expenditure and 
sales. Leverage is the ratio of total debts and total assets.
Oh is the fixed effect which is to be constant over time t and specific to the individual firm 
The p-values of each variable are shown in parentheses, a) Significant at 1%, b) Significant at 5%. 
c) Significant at 10%.
Thailand (a) (b)
Intercept -0.226
(.522)
Diversification dummy -0.151
(.023)b
-0.186
(.003)“
Size 0.009(.785)
0.010
(.640)
Profitability -0.000(.978)
0.000
(.669)
Growth 0.003
(.000)"
0.003
(.000)“
Leverage -0.001
(.835)
-0.001
(.158)
p-value o f  the model .000“ .000“
Adjusted R2 .055 .053
Number o f observations 1725 1725
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Indonesia’s results are shown in Table 8b. Diversification discounts exist in 
both models. Using OLS, the average discount of 25.5% is found whereas there is 
evidence of 33.2% discount in panel data analysis. Size and profitability have no 
significant effect on market value in either analysis. The coefficient of growth and 
leverage are significant in both models with the similar signs and magnitudes.
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TABLE 8b
Differences in market valuation 
between diversified firms and focused firms 
(Panel data analysis)
The Models: (a) y it -  a  + 8D( + fk ti +
(b) yit = Of + <X>, + fixu +
where: yu is the excess market value o f firm i at time t. Excess Market Value is the natural logarithm of
the ratio of the actual market value to the imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value
is computed by multiplying their sales in each segment by their corresponding industry median market- 
to-sales ratios, then summing across all segments. For focused firms, the imputed market values are the 
product of their sales and their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios.
2>, is Diversification dummy, which is equal to one if a firm operates in two or more segments, 
where a segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
Xu are the four control variables of firm i at time t. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Profitability is the ratio of operating income and sales. Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure and 
sales. Leverage is the ratio of total debts and total assets.
(Xi is the fixed effect which is to be constant over time t and specific to the individual firm i.
The p-values of each variable are shown in parentheses, a) Significant at 1%. b) Significant at 5%.
c) Significant at 10%.
Indonesia (a) (b)
Intercept -0.047
(.924)
Diversification dummy -0.255
(.006)°
-0.332
(.001)*
Size 0.011 -0.028
(.645) (.363)
Profitability -0.000
(.601)
0.000
(.836)
Growth 0.006 0.006
(.000)° (.000)“
Leverage -0.007(.000)*
-0.007
(.000)*
p-value of the model .000* .000*
Adjusted R2 .121 .138
Number of observations 1050 1050
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Table 8c reports the Philippines’ results. As shown, not only does the discount 
remain significant, there is an increase in magnitude as well, from 60.1% for OLS to 
81.9% for panel data. Growth and leverage also have significant effects on market 
valuation. Only size is no longer significant after controlling for firm-specific affect. 
The coefficient of profitability is not significant in either analyses.
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TABLE 8c
Differences in market valuation 
between diversified firms a n d  focused firms 
(Panel data analysis)
The Models: (a) y it -  a  + <89, + fk u + Su
(b) yu = a, + SDi +
where: yu is the excess market value of firm i at time t. Excess Market Value is the natural logarithm of
the ratio of the actual market value to the imputed market value. For diversified firms, the imputed value
is computed by multiplying their sales in each segment by their corresponding industry median market- 
to-sales ratios, then summing across all segments. For focused firms, the imputed market values are the 
product o f their sales and their corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratios.
Di is Diversification dummy, which is equal to one if a firm operates in two or more segments, 
where a segment is defined as a two-digit SIC code industry.
Xu are the four control variables of firm i at time t. Size is the natural logarithm o f total assets. 
Profitability is the ratio of operating income and sales. Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure and 
sales. Leverage is the ratio of total debts and total assets.
cti is the fixed effect which is to be constant over time t and specific to the individual firm i.
The p-values of each variable are shown in parentheses, a) Significant at 1%. b) Significant at 5%.
c) Significant at 10%.
Philippines (a) (b)
Intercept -1.181
(.101)
Diversification dummy -0.601
(.000)“
-0.819
(.000)’
Size 0.083
(.084)'
0.068
(.189)
Profitability 0.000
(.624)
0.000
(.136)
Growth 0.001
(.077)'
0.005
(.000)’
Leverage -0.012
(.000)“
-0.018
(.000)“
p-value of the model .000“ .000’
Adjusted R2 .049 .068
Number of observations 600 600
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CHAPTER ¥1 
CONCLUSIONS
This study examines how market values corporate diversification in three 
countries: Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. These countries are considered to be 
fundamentally similar in terms of economic and political system. They all have 
reputation for cronyism, monopolies as well as social inequity. All of them are in 
Southeast Asia, which experienced the economic crisis in 1997.
Over the period of study (1992-2001 for Thailand and 1994-2001 for Indonesia 
and the Philippines), it is found that there is evidence of a diversification discount in all 
countries. The largest amount of discount exists in Philippines (60.1%), followed by 
Indonesia (25.5%) and Thailand (15.1%).
Surprisingly, the 1995 results are totally different from Lins and Servaes’ study. 
Whereas they report 5.9% discount (significant at 10%), no evidence of a difference in 
market valuation between diversified firms and focused firms is found in this study.
When the sample is divided into two sub-periods: before the crisis (1992-1996) 
and after the crisis (1997-2001), the results are quite interesting. Before the crisis, the 
diversification discount existed only in the Philippines, with the average of 49%. There 
is not enough evidence that diversified firms in both Thailand and Indonesia traded at 
discount, compared to focused firms. After the crisis, however, it is found that there is 
difference in market valuation between diversified and focused firms in all three 
countries, with the average discount of 84.3% in the Philippines, 33.2% in Indonesia 
and 16.7% in Thailand.
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The results are confirmed after performing the regression on yearly data. In the 
Philippines, the diversification discount is found five out eight years of study. It became 
significant as early as 1994, three years before the crisis. Thailand and Indonesia, on the 
other hand, the difference is apparently significant after the crisis, starting in 1998 for 
Thailand and 2000 for Indonesia.
In emerging countries, it is known that external funds are limited or unavailable. 
When capital market imperfections are severe, the cost differential between internal and 
external financing increases. Firms would benefit if they depend on internal funds to 
finance their profitable projects. Diversification is an alternative for them to exploit 
internal capital market. However, there are agency costs if managers expand business 
for their personal goals rather than for shareholders’ interest. Since diversification has 
both positive effects (creating internal capital market) and negative effects (encouraging 
agency costs), it could be concluded that before the crisis, the efficient internal capital 
market hypothesis, that greater information symmetries and market imperfections create 
potential benefits through corporate diversification, works even though these benefits 
cannot dominate the overwhelming agency costs. Therefore, no significant discount is 
found in Thailand and Indonesia.
After the crisis, these countries have opened up their financial markets to global 
competition. External funds become easily to obtain, which lowers cost differentials 
between internal and external funds. The benefit of diversification in terms of creating 
efficient internal capital markets, over focused firms now disappeared. Even though 
there appear to be mechanism by which diversification can create tangible economic 
value, it is interesting that there may be some limitations. As the scale of activities rises,
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marginal and average costs per unit fall. This continues until the law of diminishing 
returns set in. Then marginal and average costs begin to rise again. One of the costs that 
might be the problem is the cost of administering the corporate giants that 
diversification has created. Also increases in organizational size and complexity are 
likely to lead to conflicts and losses of efficiency. Moreover agency costs still exist and 
even increase when firms get larger. Consequently, after the crisis diversified firms 
traded at substantial discount (24.4%-41.3% for Thailand and 31.6%-83.2% for 
Indonesia).
Since the Philippines was not affected by the economic crisis in 1997 as much as 
were Thailand and Indonesia, its financial market probably has been more sophisticated 
for quite some time. Therefore, the diversification discount is found as early as 1994, 
three years before the crisis.
Panel data analysis yields the similar results for all three countries. These 
findings do not support Campa and Kedia’s (2002) argument that firm characteristics, 
which make firms diversify, may cause the discount. They report that after controlling 
for heterogeneity among firms, the diversification discount always drops.
This study also finds that growth, represented by capital expenditure-to-sales 
ratio, signals good news to the market. It could add value to the firms although the 
amount is relatively small. On the other hand, investors evaluate debt as bad news. 
Therefore, an increase in debt could result in a value reduction.
Even though Worldscope has data available from 1992 but they are far from 
complete. This study also needs at least two focused firms in the same two-digit SIC
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code to compute the median for excess values. As a result, a lot of firms had to be 
dropped from the study, particularly in the earlier years.
Industrial groups are common in emerging markets. They play an important role 
in creating internal capital markets. Due to a lack of ownership data, this study cannot 
examine the effect of ownership structure and group membership on firm value.
However, the findings show that the effect of diversification on firm value is 
different across countries as well as the methodology used in the analysis. The effect is 
also related to differences in market infrastructure, business culture and political system 
of a country.
Although empirical results of the value of diversification strategies have been 
somewhat controversial and differ for various data samples, it is interesting to know 
whether or not there are some common characteristics that make firms diversify. Since 
the amount of discount is quite large, future research should be done to investigate 
whether those firm-specific characteristics contribute some discounts.
There is another issue that deserves attention in future. As emerging markets 
continue to grow and become more integrated into the global economy, more research 
will be needed to help global investors to better understand the nature of the risks they 
might be taking.
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APPENDIX A 
Sources of data
Worldscope is an international database containing information on more than 
20,000 corporations in 56 countries. Wright Investors’ Service (WIS), a financial 
publisher and international investment manager, developed the database- currently 
available in online, CD ROM and print formats- in 1986 as an extension to its 
investment advisory/management business. In 1990 Disclosure/Worldscope was formed 
as a strategic alliance between Disclosure, a source of U.S. public company financial 
information and WIS. WIS is to maintain the Worldscope database and provide 
Disclosure access to it whereas Disclosure markets the Worldscope product worldwide 
under the joint name.
Worldscope Database (CD ROM) used in this study:
1. January 1994
2. April 1994
3. July 1994
4. October 1994
5. January 1995
6. April 1995
7. July 1995
8. October 1995
9. April 1996
10. July 1996
11. October 1996
12. January 1997
13. April 1997
14. October 1998
15. December 1998
16. March 1999
17. June 1999
18. May 2000
19. August 2000
20. October 2000
21. January 2001
22. July 2001
23. October 2001
24. January 2002
25. April 2002
26. July 2002
27. October 2002
28. July 2003
* 1-13 from University of Richmond, Richmond VA 
14-17 from Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
18-28 from Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA
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APPENDIX B 
The portfolio approach
The portfolio approach to corporate planning was developed in the early 1960’s by
Bruce Henderson, The assumptions are as follows:
- At the business unit level, the most significant environmental variable affecting 
cash flow and profit is industry growth.
- At the business unit level, the most significant strategic variable affecting cash 
flow and profits is relative market share.
- Slow growth businesses with high relative market share generate cash to the 
firm. This group of businesses is called cash cows.
- Fast growth businesses with high relative market share in are cash neutral. We 
name businesses in this group stars as they have potential to generate cash in the 
future when growth slows.
- High growth businesses with low relative market share are net cash users. They 
are called wild cats. They need a significant amount of cash to gain share from 
the market.
- Slow growth businesses with low relative market share also are cash neutral. 
These businesses are called dogs.
The approach recognizes the dynamic nature of industry evolution. It argues that a 
mix of business units in a firm will allow the cash generated by cash cows to finance 
investment in wild cats and turn them into stars. When growth in their industries slows, 
these stars become cash cows and then finance new-coming wild cats.
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